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Abstract 
Eyewitnesses play an important role in the justice system. But 
suggestive questioning can distort eyewitness memory and confidence, and 
those distorted beliefs influence jurors (Loftus, 2005; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). 
Recent research, however, hints that suggestion is not necessary. Simply 
changing the order of a set of trivia questions altered people's beliefs about 
their accuracy on those questions (Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). I 
wondered to what degree eyewitnesses' beliefs—and in turn the jurors who 
evaluate them—would be affected by this simple change to the order in which 
they answer questions1. Across a number of experiments in Part 1 of my 
thesis2, I show that the order of questions matters: Eyewitnesses reported 
higher accuracy and were more confident about their memory when 
questions seemed initially easy than when they seemed initially difficult. In 
addition, jurors' beliefs about eyewitnesses closely matched those of the 
eyewitnesses themselves. But why does the order of questions matter? How 
does this simple rearrangement produce these alarming effects? Across a 
number of experiments in Part 2 of my thesis, I explore the extent to which the 
data are consistent with an explanation where eyewitnesses rapidly form an 
impression of their performance that is resistant to change. Taken together, 
these findings have implications for eyewitness metacognition and for 
eyewitness questioning procedures.  
                                                
1 Although the research in this thesis is my own, I conducted it in a lab and 
supervised a team comprised of research assistants and honours students. I also 
received advice and direction from my supervisors. Therefore, I often use the word 
“we” in this thesis to reflect that fact. You will also see that I use the word “we” in a 
different context when referring to what is known (or not known) in the wider 
scientific community. 
 
2 Portions of this thesis were adapted from a published manuscript and another in 
preparation. More specifically, the six experiments in Part 1 were adapted from: 
 
Michael, R. B. & Garry, M. (2015). Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1-8. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1 
 
and the five experiments in Part 2 were adapted from: 
 
Michael, R. B. & Garry, M. (manuscript in preparation). How do ordered questions 
bias eyewitnesses? 
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Part 1 
Chapter 1 
On your lunch break you decide to deposit that cheque you have been 
meaning to take care of. While waiting in line at the bank for the next available teller, 
a commotion breaks out. A man shouts, “Everybody get down!” You turn to see that 
he is brandishing a gun. You drop to the floor. The man dumps an empty duffel bag 
on the counter and signals the nearest bank teller, who begins stuffing the bag with 
money. Once filled, the man snatches the bag back, backs out of the bank, and gets 
into a car which speeds away. 
Your memory for this event is now an important element in a criminal 
investigation. Aware of that fact, you do your best to play back the event in your 
mind as you wait for the police to arrive: the colour of the man’s shirt; the defining 
features of his face; the gun; the duffel bag bulging with cash; the getaway car. A few 
minutes pass before the police arrive. They begin interviewing the eyewitnesses—
including you. 
How might that line of questioning proceed? Would the officer—following 
commonly recommended practice (Clarke, Milne, & Bull, 2011; Paulo, Albuquerque, 
& Bull, 2013)—begin by asking you some basic questions that feel relatively easy to 
answer, establishing rapport before moving on to the hard-hitting questions: What’s 
your name? Age? Address? Where do you work? Where were you standing? What were you 
doing just before the robbery began? Alternatively, would the officer—eager to find the 
robber—perhaps instead launch straight into the hard-hitting questions that feel 
relatively difficult to answer, before returning to the easier questions: What was the 
man wearing? What type of gun did he have? Can you describe his face? What about the 
duffel bag—what did it look like? What colour, make and model was the getaway car? 
Now ask yourself the following question: How would the arrangement of the 
officer’s questions influence what you believe about your memory for the robbery? 
More specifically: How would the order of difficulty of those questions—a 
seemingly trivial feature—change how you think about your memory as an 
eyewitness? And—supposing for a moment that the arrangement of questions does, 
in fact, sway your beliefs—then to what extent would your changed beliefs influence 
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what other people, like jurors, think and believe about your memory as an 
eyewitness? These are the primary questions I address in Part 1. 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY 
Memory plays a pivotal role in the criminal justice system. When people 
witness criminal activity—or even the circumstances surrounding that activity—they 
become a valuable resource. Why? Because when eyewitnesses retrieve the 
information they have previously encoded and stored in memory, they can share 
those retrieved details and help other people reconstruct the events of a crime. In 
doing so, eyewitnesses assist triers-of-fact—like jurors and judges—in building a 
coherent story of how a criminal event unfolded (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 
1992). But more importantly, eyewitnesses can provide information that holds 
probative value, indicating the guilt or innocence of suspects. 
Against a backdrop of other available evidence—like DNA, fingerprints, 
shoeprints, and bullet analysis, for example—eyewitness memory might contribute 
only one small piece to the crime puzzle. But when that other evidence is scarce, or 
worse—non-existent, eyewitness memory becomes critical and can be highly 
influential. Eyewitnesses, that is, are persuasive—particularly when they express 
themselves confidently (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Douglass, Neuschatz, 
Imrich, & Wilkinson, 2010). 
That persuasive power of the eyewitness would be entirely appropriate if 
human memory was flawless. In fact, it would be extremely convenient for the 
justice system—not to mention a remarkable cognitive feat—if memory functioned 
like a video camera. More specifically, if incoming information was recorded as a 
reliable representation of reality and could be “played back” in full fidelity, without 
error, then memory’s role in the criminal justice system would change. Memory 
would no longer be merely probative—it would be imperative. We could say, with 
utmost confidence, that a suspect is guilty because an eyewitness has a memory of 
that suspect committing the crime. 
Unfortunately, memory does not work that way—although many people 
believe it does (Simons & Chabris, 2011, 2012). Decades of scientific research shows 
that memory does not work like a video camera. Instead, as pioneering memory 
researcher Elizabeth Loftus states in her TED talk, memory works more like your 
 11 
own wikipedia page: You might be the author of an original memory, but then you 
and others can go in and make changes (Loftus, 2013). Unlike wikipedia, however, 
we do not keep a reliable record of the changes that have been made, nor who made 
them; incoming information isn’t conveniently tagged with its source (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Without that record, it becomes virtually 
impossible—without additional corroboration—to know the accuracy of what’s 
remembered. 
This ambiguity of memory accuracy poses a problem, because there are 
serious consequences when a memory system works more like a wikipedia page 
than a video camera. Consider the work of The Innocence Project, a global 
organisation dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted people through DNA 
testing. This organisation has now helped exonerate 337 people who were 
wrongfully convicted (Innocence Project, 2016). These people spent, on average, 14 
years of their lives in prison for crimes they did not commit. And these 337 people 
are only the cases we know about; they represent a fraction of those who have been 
wrongfully convicted. It is impossible to know and exceedingly difficult to even 
estimate how many innocent people are in prison this very moment (Risinger, 2007). 
But how do these travesties of justice happen? There are a number of causes, 
including: false, often coerced confessions; unvalidated or improper forensic science; 
police and prosecutorial misconduct; lying informants; and inadequate defence 
attorneys (Innocence Project, 2016). But the greatest contributing factor to the 
wrongful conviction of an innocent person is also, somewhat ironically, the least 
dubious. Eyewitness misidentification—a memory error—plays a key role in more 
than 70% of these convictions that were overturned through DNA testing (Innocence 
Project, 2016). At the heart of this societal problem lies the fragility of memory. 
DISTORTED MEMORIES AND BELIEFS 
Psychological scientists have long known that memory is easily distorted. 
Take the striking results from changing a single word in a question: In one study, 
witnesses reported cars in an accident travelled faster when a question suggested the 
cars smashed into rather than hit each other (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). In another study, 
witnesses were more likely to report seeing a non-existent broken headlight when a 
question suggested its presence using the word the, rather than the more ambiguous 
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a (Loftus & Zanni, 1975). More than four decades of research now shows that 
questions can transmit misleading suggestions that distort memory (see Loftus, 2005, 
for a review). 
But questions can distort more than the details of memories; they can exert 
equally interesting influences on metacognition and metamemory—that is, the 
thoughts, beliefs, and strategies people have about their own thinking and memory. 
For instance, eyewitnesses incorrectly answer misleading questions both quickly and 
confidently (Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989), and people generally 
provide more information—but monitor less for accuracy—when forced to answer 
questions compared with when they decide themselves what to report (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). These studies show that questions can change not only the content 
of eyewitnesses’ memories—but also how eyewitnesses think and what they believe 
about their memory. 
It is alarming that suggestive questions can so easily distort eyewitnesses’ 
memories and beliefs. But more alarming still are the potential consequences of these 
distortions. Consider how other people, like jurors, evaluate the accuracy or 
veridical status of information that an eyewitness reports. There is no tool available 
to a juror, or to anyone for that matter, that can distinguish true from false memories 
with absolute certainty. Jurors must instead rely on cues that signal accuracy, like 
the eyewitness’s behaviour. 
One of these behavioural cues that is highly influential is the confidence with 
which eyewitnesses express themselves, illustrated by the following mock-jury 
study (Cutler et al., 1990). In this study, two sets of subjects—eligible, experienced 
jurors and undergraduates—watched a videotaped trial involving eyewitness 
evidence. The researchers manipulated a collection of 10 different factors—drawn 
from psychological theory—that relate to the quality of a witness’s memory, 
including the disguise of the perpetrator, the length of time between the witnessed 
event and the witness’s identification, and the witness’s confidence. Subjects made a 
dichotomous verdict (guilty or not guilty) and estimated the probability that the 
witness’s identification was correct. Both measures were virtually identical across 
nine of the ten manipulations. That result alone is alarming. It shows that jurors’ 
evaluations of an eyewitness’s memory are unmoved by several factors that can be 
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informative about the quality of that memory. But most important was the finding 
that jurors believed the witness’s identification was 7% more likely to be correct 
when the witness testified that she was 100% confident, compared to 80% confident. 
A 7% difference might not seem like a large difference. But it is dangerous to 
underestimate the influence of a factor that, at first glance, seems trivial. Across a 
large number of cases, for example, effects traditionally considered small 
accumulate, leading to meaningful outcomes (Abelson, 1985; Rosenthal, 1990). 
Additionally, in a legal context where people’s freedom is at stake, it is vital that we 
minimise the influence of extraneous factors as much as possible. In summary, this 
finding shows that jurors are sensitive to eyewitness confidence, using confidence as 
a cue to the accuracy of an eyewitness’s memory. 
On the one hand, it might seem like good intuitive sense to rely on confidence 
as a proxy for truth. Moreover, some research supports this idea. We know, for 
example, that although the relationship between confidence and accuracy varies, it 
grows stronger as the conditions for memory become optimal (Bothwell, 
Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Brewer, Weber, Wootton, & Lindsay, 2012; Brewer & 
Wells, 2006; Deffenbacher, 1980). But the problem is that this relationship can easily 
be undermined, as illustrated in the following study (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). 
Subjects watched a security camera video of an armed robbery, and then attempted 
to identify the gunman in a photo lineup. Because the culprit was not in the lineup, 
all identifications were false. The experimenter then gave some subjects 
confirmatory feedback, saying “Good, you identified the suspect.” Subjects then 
answered a number of questions assessing their memory for, and beliefs about, the 
witnessed event. Worryingly, this simple confirmatory feedback made eyewitnesses 
more certain about their lineup choice. Moreover, the feedback made eyewitnesses 
reappraise their memory, reporting that they had a better view of the culprit, could 
make out more details of his face, and that they paid more attention. These 
eyewitnesses were also more willing to testify in court. In summary, this study 
shows that a single phrase can distort the relationship between confidence and 
accuracy: Witnesses can be confident they are right, when they are completely 
wrong. That finding also fits with more recent research on the confidence-accuracy 
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relationship, wherein illusions of familiarity turn confidence into a signal of 
inaccuracy rather than accuracy (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014). 
The implications of a hijacked confidence-accuracy relationship for the 
criminal justice system are clear. Most jurors will not know when the relationship 
between confidence and accuracy has been thwarted. It is unlikely, for example, that 
the court will hear how the officer congratulated the eyewitness on their lineup 
choice. The following study demonstrates the consequences of this lack of awareness 
(Douglass et al., 2010). In this study, mock jurors watched a videotaped eyewitness 
interview and then evaluated that eyewitness on a number of dimensions. 
Unbeknownst to the jurors, some of them were viewing an eyewitness who had been 
given confirmatory feedback about an earlier, false lineup identification. The results 
clearly showed that artificially inflated eyewitness confidence is persuasive to jurors, 
because jurors rated those witnesses who were given confirmatory feedback as more 
accurate in and confident about their identification, as having paid more attention, 
as having had a better view, and as having a better memory for faces. These findings 
are important because they show that confident witnesses persuade jurors, even 
when that confidence is an unreliable indicator of accuracy. 
Taken together, this research on eyewitnesses and jurors shows that it is vital 
we understand the factors that influence memory and confidence. One common 
element underpins these manipulations that affect people’s memories and beliefs. 
That common element is a degree of suggestion or deception. But what if suggestion 
or deception is unnecessary? What if there is another important property—a 
property of the set of questions given to eyewitnesses—that can influence what 
people believe about what they remember? 
THE INFLUENCE OF ORDERED DIFFICULTY 
Recently, researchers in cognitive psychology discovered a new important 
property of tests in an educational context: The order in which questions are 
arranged (Jackson & Greene, 2014; Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). Across a series 
of experiments, subjects answered a set of 100 trivia questions, arranged either from 
the easiest to the most difficult question, or from the most difficult to the easiest 
question. Subjects then estimated how many of the trivia questions they had 
answered correctly. Despite virtually identical objective performance, the subjects 
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who first answered the easy questions believed they answered more questions 
correctly than the subjects who first answered the difficult questions. A number of 
candidate mechanisms could explain the influence of ordered questions; I examine 
these potential explanations empirically in Part 2. 
Of course, the influence of order more generally dates back a long way. Some 
of the earliest research on memory, for example, famously established the 
importance of the temporal features of information: The classic serial position effect 
shows the relative advantage in recalling information encountered early and late in a 
series, compared to recalling information encountered in the middle (Ebbinghaus, 
1913). Order—and in particular information encountered early rather than late—is 
also important in shaping the impressions we form of other people (Anderson & 
Barrios, 1961; Asch, 1946), the attributions we make about people’s intellectual 
ability (Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968), and even the way jurors build 
a story about how events could have happened (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 
1992). 
But what is novel and surprising about these recent trivia studies is that they 
highlight the importance of not simply order in general, but more specifically the 
order of difficulty of a set of questions, in changing people’s beliefs. That property of 
order seems trivial at face value—after all, everyone answers the same overall set of 
questions—and yet its influence is not. It is also a property that has not been 
systematically examined until now, and could lead to applications in fields other 
than education—like eyewitness memory. 
We were intrigued by these trivia study findings and wondered to what 
extent the order of questions would influence eyewitnesses’ beliefs about the 
accuracy and quality of their memory. Of course, it is not obvious that the order of 
questions should influence eyewitnesses at all. Whereas trivia questions can be 
drawn from a virtually infinite pool, questions put to eyewitnesses are typically 
from a more limited set, addressing a specific and recent event. This relative 
constraint should provide fewer opportunities for uncertainty, reducing 
eyewitnesses’ reliance on heuristic processing—cognitive shortcuts that can result in 
biased judgments from seemingly innocuous manipulations (Shah & Oppenheimer, 
2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It would be surprising and worrying if a simple 
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change to the order of questions put to eyewitnesses could change how they 
appraise their memories. 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
To what extent does the order of questions put to eyewitnesses change what 
they believe about their memory? To answer that question, we showed people a 
video of a simulated crime, and then after a short delay, tested their memory for that 
crime. Importantly, we arranged the questions on the memory test in one of two 
ways: from the easiest through to the most difficult, or from the most difficult to the 
easiest. Immediately afterward, we asked people: [1] to estimate how many 
questions they thought they had answered correctly, and [2] how confident they felt 
about the accuracy of their memory for the events in the video. 
In Experiment 1, the order of questions influenced people’s beliefs about their 
memory: Subjects who first answered easy questions believed they answered more 
questions correctly than subjects who first answered difficult questions—even 
though both groups actually answered about the same number correctly. Subjects 
who first answered easy questions were also more confident about the accuracy of 
their memory. 
In Experiment 2, we showed that the influence of the order of questions was 
not limited to a particular type of test: The same pattern of results appeared when 
we changed the test from a 2-alternative forced choice recognition test to a cued-
recall test. That finding suggests that it is reasonable to expect that question order 
could have an influence in the field, where questions put to eyewitnesses are 
typically in a cued-recall format. 
In Experiment 3, we showed that the influence of the order of questions was 
not limited to a particular set of materials, nor to a fixed question set size: The same 
pattern of results appeared when we used a different simulated crime video with a 
different pool of questions, and 20 rather than 30 questions total. Those findings 
suggest that the influence of question order is robust and generalizable. 
We then wondered: To what extent does the influence of question order 
extend beyond the eyewitnesses themselves? To answer that question, we asked 
people to take on the role of jurors, evaluating an eyewitness from a previous study. 
Our jurors read an eyewitness report consisting of the questions and answers from 
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the memory test in Experiments 1-3, but unbeknownst to our jurors, we secretly 
created two versions of this report and gave half our jurors one version, and the 
other half the other version. In one version, the eyewitness began with high 
confidence in their answers but became steadily less confident—making the test 
appear as though it was first easy then became difficult. In the other version, the 
eyewitness began with low confidence in their answers but became steadily more 
confident—making the test appear as though it was difficult at first and then became 
easy. Immediately after reading the eyewitness’s report, our jurors answered two 
questions: [1] how many questions they thought the eyewitness answered correctly, 
and [2] how confident they were about the accuracy of the eyewitness’s memory. 
In Experiment 4, we showed that the influence of question arrangement 
extends beyond eyewitnesses themselves: When eyewitnesses expressed high 
confidence in their early answers through to low confidence in their late answers, 
jurors believed that those eyewitnesses answered more questions correctly and were 
more confident in the accuracy of those eyewitnesses’ memories, compared to when 
eyewitnesses expressed low confidence in their early answers through to high 
confidence in their late answers. 
In Experiment 5, we controlled for a confounding variable and ruled out an 
alternative explanation for these findings. Specifically, we showed that the results 
are driven by the eyewitness’s confidence, and not by the content of the particular 
questions associated with that confidence. 
In Experiment 6—as in Experiment 3—we showed that the influence of order 
was not limited to a particular set of materials, nor to a fixed question set size: The 
same pattern of results appeared when we used the pool of 20 questions from 
Experiment 3 that are about a different simulated crime event.  
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Chapter 2 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects. Through pilot work, we determined a sample size of 100 (50 per 
between subjects cell). We ultimately recruited a total of 102 subjects from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com)3. Age and gender information for this and all 
other experiments is presented in Appendix A. 
Design. We used a simple two groups design with Question Order (low-to 
high confidence, high-to-low confidence) manipulated between subjects. 
Procedure. We used Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) to 
present instructions and materials in subjects’ web browsers. The experiment had 
four phases. First, we told subjects the study was examining visual and verbal 
learning styles. We used this minor deception because revealing the true purpose of 
the experiment—that it was investigating the influence of the order of questions on 
eyewitness memory—would likely influence the results. We also gave subjects a set 
of general experimental instructions to follow. Next, subjects answered demographic 
questions: age, country of origin, country of residence, gender, and level of 
education. Because none of these measures were reliable covariates in any 
experiment, I will not discuss them further. However, the interested reader can see 
Appendix A for age and gender information. Subjects then watched one of two 
similar videos of a tradesman who stole items from the unoccupied house in which 
he was working (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006). We counterbalanced video 
versions across subjects and conditions. 
The second phase began when the video ended. To encourage a small degree 
of memory decay—similar to what is likely to take place in settings outside of a 
                                                
3 Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics—the survey software that we use as our experimental 
platform—interact in such a way that it is possible to inadvertently collect more data points 
than requested. Subjects view a brief description of the experiment on Mechanical Turk that 
includes a link to the survey. If subjects choose to participate, they should click an “Accept” 
button on Mechanical Turk that reserves the subject a place in the allotted pool. Some 
subjects do not click this button. Instead, they go directly to the survey and complete it. 
Occasionally, when returning to Mechanical Turk to click “Accept “, these subjects find that 
all allocated spaces have already been filled. These additional subjects were included in all 
analyses. 
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controlled laboratory experiment—subjects solved Sudoku number puzzles for 10 
minutes. 
In the third phase, subjects took a surprise memory test consisting of 30 two-
alternative forced choice (2AFC) questions about the video. 
To construct the order of test items, we used data from an earlier, separate 
group of 107 subjects. These subjects followed the procedure described so far before 
answering the 30 questions in random, computer-generated orders. Twenty of the 30 
questions came from the same published set of materials as the video (Takarangi et 
al., 2006). The confidence people report in their answers to these 20 questions, 
however, skews high, suggesting that none of the questions feels particularly 
difficult (M = 4.10 on a 5 point scale, range = 2.29 – 4.97; Foster, unpublished data). 
We therefore generated an additional 10 questions we thought subjects would find 
difficult. For each of the 30 questions, subjects used a scale from 1 (“Not at all 
confident”) to 5 (“Very confident”) to report their confidence they had selected the 
correct answer. Then, using these confidence ratings, we ordered the 30 questions 
from the lowest mean confidence (M = 1.73, SD = 1.06) to highest mean confidence 
(M = 4.79, SD = 0.63) to produce the low-to-high confidence test. We reversed this 
order to create the high-to-low confidence version4. See Appendix B for the complete 
list of questions, answers, and associated confidence ratings. 
Subjects in the current experiment were randomly assigned one of these two 
test versions. For each question, subjects selected one of the two possible answers 
they thought was correct, and then used a scale from 1 (“Not at all confident”) to 5 
(“Very confident”) to report their confidence they had selected the correct answer. 
The fourth phase followed the memory test. Subjects answered two randomly 
ordered questions: [1] “The memory test you just took consisted of 30 questions. 
How many of those questions do you think you answered correctly?” Subjects 
responded with a number between 0 and 30; [2] “Suppose that you were asked to 
testify as an eyewitness. How confident would you be in your memory of the events 
                                                
4 To consider the possibility that the subjective experience of confidence tracked subjective 
difficulty, we asked a group of 141 people to rate the difficulty of each randomly ordered 
question on a scale from 1 (“Very easy”) to 5 (“Very difficult”). When we compared items in 
this group with items in the group of 107 subjects, we found that reported difficulty closely 
matched reported confidence (r = -.82, 95% CI [-.66, -.91], p < .001, treating items as cases), 
suggesting that confidence was a good proxy for subjective difficulty. 
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you saw in the video?” Subjects responded on a scale from 1 (“Not at all confident”) 
to 5 (“Very confident”). Finally, subjects answered a number of questions assessing 
compliance with the set of general instructions given in Phase 1. The full list of these 
questions appears in Appendix F. To encourage honest responding, we made 
subjects aware they would receive compensation irrespective of their answers to 
these compliance questions. 
Results and Discussion 
In all experiments, the overall pattern of results was consistent when 
including or excluding subjects who failed to comply with any of our general 
instructions. That finding suggests that the general instructions were not a necessary 
condition to elicit any effects of interest. We therefore included all subjects in the 
reported analyses. There were no other exclusion criteria. 
We first performed a manipulation check by examining mean confidence 
ratings for individual test questions. These data appear in the top panel of Figure 1 
and show that our manipulation worked: “low-to-high” subjects were increasingly 
confident and “high-to-low” subjects were decreasingly confident. The middle panel 
of Figure 1 displays mean accuracy for individual test questions and shows a similar 
pattern—although less cleanly, as a consequence of binary 2AFC scoring. The 
bottom panel of Figure 1 displays the mean confidence-accuracy relationships for 
individual test questions and suggests that the order of questions did not affect 
subjects’ insight into their own accuracy. We also found that the order of questions 
had little effect on overall test performance, Mdiff = 0.65 (2.17%), 95% confidence 
interval (CI) [-0.46, 1.76]; t(100) = 1.15, p = .252. 
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Figure 1. Top panel: Mean confidence of a correct answer for each test question, ordered by 
position on test. Middle panel: Proportion of subjects who answered each test question 
correctly, ordered by position on test. Bottom panel: Pearson correlations between confidence 
and accuracy ratings for each test question, ordered by position on test. Note that the test 
versions are symmetric, i.e., question 1 in one condition is the same as question 30 in the 
other condition. Data are from Experiment 1. 
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We now address our primary questions: To what extent did the order of 
questions [1] bias subjects’ retrospective estimates of their test performance, and [2] 
affect their confidence in the accuracy of their memory? To answer [1], we subtracted 
subjects’ test scores from their retrospective estimates to produce bias scores. 
Positive bias scores represent subjects who thought they performed better on the test 
than they truly did, and negative bias scores represent subjects who thought they 
performed worse on the test than they truly did. We present mean test scores and 
mean retrospective estimates of test scores in the top panel of Figure 2. We present 
mean bias scores in the middle panel of Figure 2. These data show that low-to-high 
confidence subjects were more pessimistic than high-to-low confidence subjects, 
Mdiff = 2.32 (7.73%), 95% CI [0.33, 4.32]; t(100) = 2.31, p = .023. To answer [2], we 
examined subjects’ mean post-test reports of memory confidence. These data appear 
in the bottom panel of Figure 2 and show that low-to-high confidence subjects were 
less confident about the accuracy of their memory: Mdiff = 0.46 (11.50%), 95% CI 
[0.08, 0.84]; t(100) = 2.41, p = .018 (for all experiments in Part 1, we report cell means 
and SDs in Tables 1 and 2). 
In a forensic setting, it is unlikely that most questions put to eyewitnesses will 
rely simply on recognition—as is the case when questions appear as a forced choice 
between two alternatives. Instead, most questions will rely on what the eyewitness 
can recall. Recall tasks are more difficult than recognition tasks and provide less 
constraint, because the correct answer now comes from a potentially much larger 
pool of possible answers. On the one hand, that relatively greater freedom to “roam” 
memory in a recall task could lead to greater variability in the experience of 
difficulty across questions, diminishing the influence of question order. On the other 
hand, research using the trivia question paradigm relies on recall and successfully 
finds an influence of question order (Jackson & Greene, 2014; Weinstein & Roediger, 
2010, 2012). Nonetheless, it would be useful to similarly demonstrate such a finding 
in an eyewitness context. Therefore, to determine the extent to which these effects 
would generalize to the more real-world situation of open-ended questions, we 
conducted Experiment 2. 
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Figure 2. Top panel: Mean actual and estimated test scores by condition. Middle panel: Mean 
bias (estimated test score - actual test score) by condition. Positive bias scores represent 
subjects who thought they performed better than they truly did; negative bias scores 
represent the opposite. Bottom panel: Mean post-test memory confidence by condition. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals of cell means. Data are from Experiment 1. 
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Table 1. Experiments 1, 2, and 3 mean scores for Bias and Confidence by condition. 
 Bias Confidence 
 Condition   Condition   
 High-to-low Low-to-high MDiff 95% CI High-to-low Low-to-high MDiff 95% CI 
Expt 1 (N = 102) -3.08 (5.03) -5.40 (5.13) 2.32 0.33, 4.32 3.44 (0.89) 2.98 (1.04) 0.46 0.08, 0.84 
Expt 2 (N = 220) 1.64 (5.49) -2.02 (4.43) 3.65 2.33, 4.98 2.69 (1.08) 2.32 (0.94) 0.37 0.10, 0.64 
Expt 3 (N = 205) -3.25 (4.00) -5.13 (3.43) 1.88 0.86, 2.90 2.99 (1.01) 2.71 (0.97) 0.28 0.01, 0.55 
Meta-analysis   10.33% 7.36, 13.30   0.36 0.19, 0.52 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Note: The meta-analysed difference is a percentage, because 
the number of test questions was 30 in Experiment 1 and 2, but 20 in Experiment 3. 
 
Table 2. Experiments 4, 5, and 6 mean scores for Estimate and Confidence by condition. 
 Estimate Confidence 
 Condition   Condition   
 High-to-low Low-to-high MDiff 95% CI High-to-low Low-to-high MDiff 95% CI 
Expt 4 (N = 261) 17.47 (4.81) 14.23 (4.29) 3.23 2.12, 4.34 3.15 (0.84) 2.67 (0.84) 0.47 0.27, 0.68 
Expt 5 (N = 305) 17.79 (4.52) 13.62 (5.13) 4.18 3.09, 5.27 3.06 (0.85) 2.34 (0.92) 0.72 0.52, 0.92 
Expt 6 (N = 316) 12.33 (3.30) 10.46 (3.38) 1.88 1.14, 2.62 3.06 (0.91) 2.64 (0.89) 0.42 0.22, 0.62 
Meta-analysis   11.38% 8.77, 14.00   0.54 0.36, 0.72 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Note: The meta-analysed difference is a percentage, because 
the number of test questions was 30 in Experiments 4 and 5, but 20 in Experiment 6. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects. To boost precision, we recruited a larger sample of 220 Mechanical 
Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. Experiment 2 followed the design and procedure of 
Experiment 1, except we converted each 2AFC question into a cued-recall question. 
Results and Discussion 
We scored subjects’ responses to the questions by a computerised keyword 
search. For example, if a subject’s response to the question, “How many 
toothbrushes were in the bathroom?” included either “six” or “6”, it was marked 
correct. To ensure scoring was not unfairly conservative, the keyword search 
ignored letter case and whitespace in subjects’ responses. In addition, a blind rater 
hand-scored a random 20% of responses; keyword and hand scores were highly 
correlated, r = 0.96, p < .001. For the complete list of questions and keywords, see 
Appendix C. 
This new format replicated the earlier results: the order of questions had little 
effect on overall test performance, Mdiff = 0.61 (2.03%), 95% confidence interval (CI) [-
0.35, 1.57]; t(218) = 1.25, p = .213, yet low-to-high confidence subjects were more 
pessimistic, Mdiff = 3.65 (12.17%), 95% CI [2.33, 4.98]; t(218) = 5.43, p < .001; and were 
less confident about the accuracy of their memory, Mdiff = 0.37 (9.25%), 95% CI [0.10, 
0.64]; t(218) = 2.73, p = .007. We next ran Experiment 3 to ensure these effects were 
not tied to specific materials. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects. We recruited a new sample of 205 Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure was the same as 
Experiment 1, except subjects viewed a different video and answered a different set 
of twenty 2AFC questions (French, Garry, & Mori, 2011). 
To construct the order of test items, we again used data from an earlier, 
separate group of 106 subjects who answered the 20 questions in random, computer-
generated orders. For each question, subjects used a scale from 1 (“Very easy”) to 5 
(“Very difficult”) to rate the difficulty of the question. We used subjective difficulty 
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because one criticism of the prior experiments was that confidence—despite being a 
good proxy for subjective difficulty—is not necessarily the same thing. Using these 
difficulty ratings, we ordered the questions from those rated easiest (M = 1.61, SD = 
1.07) to those rated most difficult (M = 4.67, SD = 0.74) to produce the high-to-low 
confidence test. We reversed this order to create the low-to-high confidence version. 
Note that this naming convention is merely used for consistency. Subjects were 
randomly assigned one of these two test versions. See Appendix D for the complete 
list of questions, answers, and difficulty ratings. 
Results and Discussion 
As before, we found that low-to-high confidence subjects were more 
pessimistic, Mdiff = 1.88 (9.40%), 95% CI [0.86, 2.90]; t(203) = 3.62, p < .001; they were 
also less confident about the accuracy of their memory, Mdiff = 0.28 (7.00%), 95% CI 
[0.01, 0.55]; t(203) = 2.05, p = .042. These data show that the influence of the order of 
questions generalizes to different materials. 
In line with the recommendations of Cumming (2013), we obtained more 
precise estimates of these effect sizes by meta-analysing the results of Experiments 1, 
2, and 3, using ESCI software to run two random effects model meta-analyses. These 
analyses estimate that “low-to-high” eyewitnesses would be 10.33% more 
pessimistic about their performance than “high-to-low” eyewitnesses, Mdiff = 10.33%, 
95% CI [7.36, 13.30], z = 6.82, p < .001. These “low-to-high” eyewitnesses would also 
be 0.36 points, or 9.00%, less confident about what they remember, Mdiff = 0.36, 95% 
CI [0.19, 0.52], z = 4.10, p < .001. 
The results of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 show that the order of questions shapes 
what eyewitnesses believe. Specifically, when people answered questions that 
initially seemed difficult and then became easy, they were more pessimistic and less 
confident about their memory compared with others who answered questions that 
initially seemed easy and then became difficult. 
In changing how eyewitnesses appraise their memories, one possible 
consequence is that jurors will appraise the eyewitness's credibility in the same 
direction (Douglass et al., 2010). Such a result would have disturbing implications 
for the justice system. Because jurors tend to rely on eyewitness confidence as a 
signal of accuracy (Penrod & Cutler, 1995), we asked subjects in Experiments 4, 5, 
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and 6 to take on the role of a juror, evaluating an eyewitness whose confidence 
systematically changed over the course of questioning. 
Experiment 4 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to collect data from 200 people but ultimately recruited 
261 Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design. We used a two groups design with Question Order (low-to-high 
confidence, high-to-low confidence) manipulated between subjects. 
Procedure. We asked people to take on the role of a juror and answer 
questions about an eyewitness who had been in a previous study. We told these 
“jurors” that in the previous study, the eyewitness had taken a memory test after 
watching the video of Eric the Electrician. The juror's task was not to watch the 
video but to carefully read the eyewitness's memory test and then answer some 
questions. 
To mirror the real-world scenario where a group of jurors evaluate one 
eyewitness, all jurors within a condition actually read a single eyewitness’s test that 
we secretly created. In the high-to-low confidence condition, we manufactured the 
test so that the eyewitness's answers were initially confident but became less 
confident over the test. In the low-to-high confidence condition, this pattern 
reversed. We used data from Experiment 1 to help create these two versions of the 
eyewitness’s test. First, we randomly selected, for each of the 30 test questions, 
which answer the eyewitness had ostensibly chosen. Next, we calculated the mean 
confidence ratings eyewitnesses had given to each of the 30 questions in Experiment 
1, rounding each mean to an integer. We used these integers to select positions on 
the Likert scales the eyewitness had ostensibly used to report their confidence that 
each answer was correct. The result of this procedure was a completed eyewitness 
test with 30 questions, 30 randomly selected answers, and 30 confidence ratings that 
descended from high to low. We then flipped this entire test to produce the other 
version. 
Subject jurors randomly received either the low-to-high confidence or high-to-
low confidence eyewitness test, formatted exactly like the test in Experiment 1. 
Immediately after reading the eyewitness’s test, subjects answered two randomly 
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ordered questions: [1] “The memory test about Eric the Electrician consisted of 30 
questions. How many of those questions do you think the eyewitness answered 
correctly?” Subjects responded with a number between 0 and 30; [2] “How confident 
are you about the accuracy of the eyewitness's memory?” Subjects responded on a 
scale from 1 (“Not at all confident”) to 5 (“Very confident”). 
Results and Discussion 
Jurors believed that an initially confident eyewitness was more accurate, 
estimating that these eyewitnesses answered more questions correctly, Mdiff = 3.23 
(10.77%), 95% CI [2.12, 4.34]; t(259) = 5.73, p < .001. Jurors also reported more 
confidence in these eyewitnesses’ memories, Mdiff = 0.47 (11.75%), 95% CI [0.27, 0.68]; 
t(259) = 4.54, p < .001. 
Note, however, that the pattern of the eyewitness’s confidence ratings always 
covaried with the pattern of questions put to that eyewitness. That is, each of the 30 
test questions always appeared with the same confidence rating. This confound 
leaves open the possibility that jurors were influenced not by the eyewitness’s 
confidence, but by the content of the questions. We ran Experiment 5 to address this 
counter-explanation. 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to boost precision by increasing observations to 150 per 
between subjects cell, ultimately recruiting 305 Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 4, except that we randomly assigned, for each subject, which question 
would appear with each confidence rating. This modification decoupled question 
content from confidence ratings, while maintaining the ascending or descending 
pattern of eyewitness confidence. 
Results and Discussion 
We found again that subjects believed high-to-low confidence eyewitnesses 
answered more questions correctly, Mdiff = 4.18 (13.93%), 95% CI [3.09, 5.27]; t(303) = 
7.54, p < .001, and were more confident about the accuracy of these eyewitnesses’ 
memories, Mdiff = 0.72 (18.00%), 95% CI [0.52, 0.92]; t(303) = 7.10, p < .001. 
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Finally, we ran Experiment 6 to demonstrate that these effects were not tied to 
specific materials. 
Experiment 6 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to collect 150 observations per between subjects cell, and 
ultimately recruited 316 Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 5, but used the set of test questions from Experiment 3. We created the 
two versions of the eyewitness’s report using data from Experiment 3. We calculated 
mean confidence ratings for each of the 20 questions, rounding each mean to an 
integer so it could be represented on the Likert scale of confidence the eyewitness 
had ostensibly used. We also randomly selected, for each test question, which 
answer the eyewitness had ostensibly chosen. We decoupled these questions from 
their associated confidence ratings by randomly assigning questions to each 
confidence rating. Subjects randomly received either the low-to-high confidence or 
high-to-low confidence eyewitness test. 
Results and Discussion 
We found again that jurors believed high-to-low confidence eyewitnesses 
answered more questions correctly, Mdiff = 1.88 (9.40%), 95% CI [1.14, 2.62]; t(314) = 
4.99, p < .001, and jurors were also more confident about the accuracy of these 
eyewitnesses’ memories, Mdiff = 0.42 (10.50%), 95% CI [0.22, 0.62]; t(314) = 4.14, p < 
.001. 
The findings from Experiments 4, 5, and 6 fit with those of Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3, in which eyewitnesses thought they answered more questions correctly and 
reported higher confidence in their memory if their initial experience was one of 
high confidence. We meta-analysed the results of Experiments 4, 5, and 6 (Cumming, 
2013) and estimated that jurors believe “high-to-low” eyewitnesses answer 11.38% 
more questions correctly, Mdiff = 11.38%, 95% CI [8.77, 14.00], z = 8.53, p < .001. 
Moreover, jurors are 0.54 points—or 13.50%—more confident about the accuracy of a 
“high-to-low” eyewitness’s memory, Mdiff = 0.54, 95% CI [0.36, 0.72], z = 5.75, p < 
.001. 
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Chapter 3 
Across six experiments, we found that the order in which eyewitnesses 
answered questions mattered in two key ways. First, the order changed how 
eyewitnesses appraised themselves. When questions produced an initial experience 
of high confidence rather than low confidence, eyewitnesses believed that they were 
more accurate and were more confident about their memory. Second, the order 
changed how jurors appraised eyewitnesses. Jurors believed eyewitnesses who 
initially displayed high confidence were more accurate, and jurors were more 
confident about those eyewitnesses’ memories. This collection of results paints a 
worrying picture of the malleability of beliefs about memory accuracy. 
It is surprising that questions produce different beliefs in witnesses when all 
that changes is the order those questions are asked. Ultimately, everyone answers 
the same questions, so it seems reasonable to expect no differences in beliefs. But the 
influence of order shows that beliefs about memory are shaped not only by the 
content or phrasing of questions, but also by factors that—on the face of it—are 
trivial. 
In fact, our seemingly trivial manipulation produced effects similar in size to 
more blatant manipulations affecting eyewitness credibility. An eyewitness who 
claims to be absolutely certain, for example, is rated more credible than an 
eyewitness who does not (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007), and 
prosecution eyewitnesses who elaborate their testimony with extra details are more 
credible, and get more guilty verdicts, than eyewitnesses who do not (Bell & Loftus, 
1988, 1989). It is worrying that our subtle manipulation produces effects similar in 
magnitude to these relatively heavy-handed approaches. 
How can we explain our effects? One possibility is that people’s attention 
wanes over the test, resulting in beliefs influenced most by early experience (Crano, 
1977). If this attention decrement hypothesis is true, then we might expect that the 
same question would be answered with higher accuracy when it appears early 
rather than late. To investigate this possibility, we ran a random effects model meta-
analysis comprising all three datasets from Experiments 1, 2, and 3. This meta-
analysis compared accuracy between groups for the subjectively easiest and most 
difficult test questions, because each appears first for one group and last for the 
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other. We found no support for this attention-based explanation: Accuracy is not 
notably different when a question appears first rather than last, Mdiff = -0.01, 95% CI 
[-0.04, 0.02], z = -0.40, p = .686. 
An alternative explanation is that the effects are driven by early experience 
and insufficient adjustments: The subjective ease or difficulty of early questions sets 
an anchor, and to save effort, people adjust from this anchor only until reaching a 
plausible impression (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). This explanation is consistent with 
our data and that from recent research in which subjects held biased impressions of 
performance throughout a trivia test, and not merely at the end (Weinstein & 
Roediger, 2010, 2012). Relatedly, Experiments 4-6 suggest that jurors used early 
information to create a story about the eyewitness’s credibility and were slow to 
revise that story in the face of new information. This explanation fits with the Story 
Model of juror decision-making, a model in which juror’s verdicts are influenced by 
the stories they construct to make sense of events (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988, 
1992). I conduct a more thorough investigation of the mechanisms responsible for 
the biasing influence of question arrangement in Part 2. 
Our findings have implications for eyewitnesses’ metacognition, because they 
suggest that the order of questions influences eyewitnesses’ ability to evaluate what 
they know about an event. Similarly, our findings are reminiscent of other 
suggestive techniques that manipulate eyewitness beliefs, such as subtle changes to 
the wording of questions, or direct feedback about lineup identifications (Douglass 
& Steblay, 2006; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975). But in contrast, we 
have manipulated what eyewitnesses and jurors believe about memory without 
using suggestive techniques. 
Our findings also raise interesting questions. For instance, does the order of 
questions influence other related judgments, such as eyewitnesses’ estimates of how 
well they saw the perpetrator? We know that positive post-identification feedback 
enhances eyewitnesses’ beliefs about their memory for a crime, including how well 
they could see a suspect’s face and how much attention they paid (Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998). Perhaps an initial experience of subjectively easy questions causes 
similar enhancements. It would also be useful to know if the order of questions 
produces lasting changes in beliefs or if the influence is fleeting. Finally, it is worth 
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considering that we ordered questions in our experiments either by subjective 
confidence or subjective difficulty. Earlier work has ordered questions by objective 
difficulty, calculated as the mean proportion of people who answer a question 
correctly (Jackson & Greene, 2014; Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). Our results 
suggest that the subjective experience of difficulty may underpin the influence of 
question order—but a future experiment teasing apart subjective and objective 
difficulty could provide information about their relative contributions. 
Moreover, what makes a question easy or difficult? In the trivia studies, 
difficulty was operationalized as the proportion of people who answer a question 
correctly, based on prior norms. Our alternative is the subjective experience of ease 
or confidence. But these definitions tell us only which questions people are likely to 
answer correctly or experience as easy, not why. There are a multitude of reasons 
why questions vary in difficulty. Questions are typically easy when they assess 
information: we know well; that is emotional; that received more attention; or even 
that simply feels easy to remember (Cahill & McGaugh, 1995; Christianson & Loftus, 
1991; Oppenheimer, 2008). The questions used in my experiments likely contain a 
complex mix of these characteristics, and I hypothesise that the subjective experience 
of difficulty is influential irrespective of the underlying question characteristics 
producing it. But it would be useful in future work to disentangle these properties, 
in order to better understand the nature of questions in a forensic setting. 
Eyewitnesses play an undeniably important role in the justice system. But 
justice requires that we protect the integrity of eyewitness memory as much as 
possible. That integrity is called into question when eyewitnesses and jurors are 
swayed by something as trivial as the order in which they answer questions. It is 
therefore crucial that we gain a better understanding of the underlying 
psychological mechanisms responsible for the biasing influence of question 
arrangement. That is the focus of Part 2. 
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Part 2 
Chapter 1 
In Part 1 I documented, over a series of six experiments, the influence of 
question arrangement on eyewitnesses’ and jurors’ beliefs about eyewitness 
memory. Those findings are novel and alarming because they show that there is a 
new cause for concern where memory intersects with the law. You do not need to 
use suggestive techniques to change what people believe about their memory, or 
even what people believe about someone else’s memory. Instead, the findings 
suggest that something as seemingly trivial as starting an interview with a few easy 
questions could be enough to sway an eyewitness into thinking that, overall, she did 
a great job—even though she did not. 
But we have yet to answer the question of how the arrangement of questions 
exerts its influence. That is the focus of Part 2. Naturally, there are a number of 
candidate explanations. I will begin by addressing those explanations covered in 
prior research that have little-to-no evidence in their favour. Then I will address 
more promising explanations and outline a series of experiments investigating the 
mechanism(s) responsible for the biasing influence of question order. 
THE PRIMACY EFFECT 
One explanation for how the arrangement of questions influences people 
relates to how people encode and remember information from a series. One of the 
most famous and robust findings in memory research—the serial position effect—is 
the relative advantage in recalling information encountered early and late in a series, 
compared to recalling information encountered in the middle (Ebbinghaus, 1913). 
The relative advantage in recalling early information is known as the primacy effect, 
and the relative advantage in recalling late information is known as the recency effect. 
Primacy effects typically occur because people have more opportunity to rehearse 
early information, which strengthens its transfer into long-term memory. Recency 
effects typically occur because late information is still available in short-term (or 
working) memory (Glenberg et al., 1980; Marshall & Werder, 1972; Rundus, 1980)5. 
                                                
5 There are, in fact, a number of explanations for recency effects that differ primarily 
according to the length of time information is retained. But the focus here is on an 
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Perhaps, then, when people are asked to evaluate the quality of their memory 
after taking a memory test—either by giving an estimate for how well they’ve done 
or by reporting how confident they feel about the accuracy of their memory—what 
they remember best is the earliest information. For people who first answered easy 
questions, this primacy effect would result in evaluations skewed towards higher 
estimates and confidence. For people who first answered difficult questions, this 
primacy effect would result in evaluations skewed towards lower estimates and 
confidence. 
But there are a number of reasons why this explanation is unlikely to be 
correct, or at the least is insufficient. First, the evaluations people make happen 
immediately after the memory test. We should therefore see the influence of a 
recency effect in addition to a primacy effect. But the pattern of results across these 
experiments fits only with a primacy effect and not a recency effect. Second, in trivia 
question studies where people are asked immediately following the test to report the 
questions they remember, the questions they tend to report are the most recent—not 
the earliest (Franco, 2015). That finding of a recency effect is the exact opposite of 
what we should see if the primacy explanation were true. Third, this explanation 
suggests that the influence of question arrangement arises only when people recall 
the questions while making their evaluations. But research shows that the influence 
of question arrangement arises during the test experience, and not merely afterward 
when making evaluations (Weinstein & Roediger, 2012). 
Taken together, an explanation that relies purely on a memory-based primacy 
effect cannot adequately explain the influence of question arrangement—both 
theoretically and empirically. 
THE AFFECT HEURISTIC 
Another explanation for how the arrangement of questions influences people 
relates to the use of a particular mental shortcut that people employ when making 
decisions. The use of mental shortcuts—or heuristics—in general is adaptive 
(Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). When situations arise where 
difficult decisions or judgements must be made with speed and efficiency, it makes 
                                                                                                                                                  
explanation for the influence of question arrangement that relies on a primacy effect, and so 
I will not expand further on different recency effect explanations. 
 35 
little sense to rely on a process that requires a lengthy, exhaustive search for 
information. Instead, we can take mental shortcuts, using quick processes that 
incorporate whatever information is readily available to simplify decisions and 
judgements (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Typically, there is little to no cost in using 
these heuristics. But in certain circumstances our mental shortcuts can lead us astray, 
resulting in a number of different cognitive biases (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & 
Johnson, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). 
One source of information that is readily available is our emotional response, 
or affect. We can use the positive or negative feelings that we rapidly—and typically 
involuntarily—generate in response to stimuli to quickly make judgements and 
decisions (Finucane et al., 2000; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Winkielman, Zajonc, & 
Schwarz, 1997; Zajonc, 1980). Perhaps, then, when people are asked to evaluate the 
quality of their memory after taking a memory test, their feelings influence their 
evaluations. If people feel relatively positive, their evaluations will be skewed 
towards higher estimates and confidence, but if people feel relatively negative, their 
evaluations will be skewed towards lower estimates and confidence. 
There are a number of problems with this explanation, too. First, everyone 
answers the same overall set of questions, so there is no good reason to expect that 
people who begin with easy questions will feel more positive after the test than 
people who end with those same easy questions. Second, and relatedly, the 
explanation would require not only that people employ the affect heuristic, but also 
that the early questions evoke stronger emotional responses than later questions. If 
that were true, we should expect to see higher reports of confidence in people’s 
answers to easy questions when they appear early rather than late, and lower 
reports of confidence in people’s answers to difficult questions when they appear 
early rather than late. But research using the trivia question paradigm has found no 
differences in confidence ratings in response to individual questions (Weinstein & 
Roediger, 2010). Third, research shows that people’s reports of how much they are 
enjoying a trivia test varies according to question difficulty, but not order (Weinstein 
& Roediger, 2012). In other words, on average people find the test similarly 
enjoyable, regardless of the order of questions. 
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Taken together, an explanation that relies purely on the affect heuristic—
much like the preceding primacy explanation—cannot adequately explain the 
influence of question arrangement, both theoretically and empirically. 
THE ANCHORING-AND-ADJUSTMENT HEURISTIC 
Another explanation for how the arrangement of questions influences people 
relates to the use of a different mental shortcut—the anchoring-and-adjustment 
heuristic. Just as we can draw on our current and readily available feelings when 
making decisions or judgements, so too can we draw on our readily available 
knowledge about numbers, dates, and values (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Anchoring-and-adjustment is a two-step process. In the first step of this 
process, we receive or generate an anchor—a piece of numeric information—from or 
in response to a question about which our answer is uncertain. Sometimes that 
anchor is given to us in an initial, comparative question (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). For example, the anchor 5,000 in the question, “Is the population of Timaru 
greater or less than 5,000?” would precede the question “What is the population of 
Timaru?” At other times, we provide our own anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). For 
example, when encountering the question “What is the population of Timaru?” a 
person living in Wellington might spontaneously generate the population of 
Wellington as an anchor; an answer known to be wrong but that nonetheless comes 
easily to mind. In the second step of this process, we adjust away from the anchor 
before giving an answer. But because adjustments require effort and attention, we 
typically adjust only until we reach a plausible value (Crano, 1977; Epley & Gilovich, 
2006). Our adjustments are therefore frequently insufficient, and lead to answers that 
are biased towards the initial anchor. 
Perhaps, then, when people are asked to evaluate the quality of their memory 
after taking a memory test, those evaluations are a product of the repeated use of the 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic that occurred over the course of the test. More 
specifically, the first test questions set a subjective anchor—e.g., “I’m getting 100% 
right” for the people who start with easy questions, or “I’m getting 0% right” for the 
people who start with difficult questions—and because adjustments are insufficient, 
the end result is evaluations that are biased towards those anchors. 
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Data from research using the trivia-question paradigm are consistent with 
this explanation. In one experiment, subjects answered a series of 100 trivia 
questions arranged either from the easiest through to the most difficult, or vice 
versa. After each block of 10 questions, subjects estimated how many of those 10 
questions they had answered correctly. On every block, subjects who first answered 
easy questions thought they answered more questions correctly than subjects who 
first answered difficult questions—a pattern of results suggesting that subjects 
anchored to an initial, self-generated value that they failed to adequately adjust 
away from (Weinstein & Roediger, 2012). 
There are at least two problems with this explanation, however. First, an 
anchor is a number, either generated in response to a question or given in the 
question itself. But in our paradigm, there are no anchors in the questions, and the 
questions themselves are not about numbers. We might therefore expect that people 
do not generate an anchor. Of course, subjects could generate their own—but even if 
they do, recall from Experiment 1 that people’s insight into their own accuracy 
varies considerably; people do not necessarily know when they are right and when 
they are wrong. We might expect then, that even if subjects do generate their own 
anchors, that they will vary widely. Alternatively, people might generate an anchor 
that is not a number per se, but rather a general belief about their performance. If 
that is the case, however, the explanation more closely resembles an alternative 
explanation based on how people form impressions—an explanation I return to in 
more depth later. Second, this explanation is incomplete, or at the least relies on an 
unusual definition of the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. Typically, 
experiments investigating the influence of the heuristic use a single anchor—given 
or generated in response to a single question—which subjects adjust away from. But 
in our experiments and those using the trivia-questions paradigm, people are given 
multiple questions. It is unclear what role each new question would play. For 
instance, is each question considered a new anchor, or only the first, with later 
questions instead merely being a cue used in adjustment? The former implies a 
repeating anchoring-and-adjustment process, while the latter implies a single 
anchoring process with repeated adjustment processes. In either case, the 
formulation is not typical of the paradigm. While it is at least plausible to modify the 
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explanation to fit within our paradigm, these issues highlight one of the key 
problems plaguing the heuristics approach: They can at once explain everything and 
nothing (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
IMPRESSION FORMATION 
One final explanation for how the arrangement of questions influences people 
relates to the way we form impressions about others and ourselves. We have long 
known that when it comes to our developing beliefs about others, not all information 
is created equal. Research shows that people can rapidly form impressions of other 
entities—typically people or groups of people—and these impressions seem to have 
a “sticky” quality; they are frequently resistant to change (Anderson, 1965; Anderson 
& Barrios, 1961; Asch, 1946; DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; 
McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994, 1997). Take, for example, a classic paradigm 
demonstrating this effect. Subjects are read a list of adjectives that describe a person, 
and are asked to form an impression of that person. These adjectives might progress, 
for instance, from positive through to negative descriptors, as in the following list: 
brilliant, creative, kind, unattractive, opinionated, shallow. For half the subjects, the 
adjectives are read in reverse order. When subjects then give a description of the 
person or rate them on a number of evaluative dimensions, a consistent pattern 
emerges: The first adjectives are most influential in the development of the overall, 
resulting impression. For example, subjects who first heard brilliant will have a more 
favourable impression of the person than subjects who first heard shallow—even 
though both groups heard the same entire list (Anderson, 1965; Anderson & Barrios, 
1961; Asch, 1946). This phenomenon is summed up by the colloquial phrase “first 
impressions last.” 
Why are first impressions so influential? There are at least three explanations. 
One explanation—the attention decrement hypothesis—supposes that attention 
declines over time, such that early information receives the most attention and is 
therefore most influential (Crano, 1977). A second explanation—the change-of-
meaning hypothesis—suggests that early information establishes an expectation that 
later information will be consistent with that early information. As such, the 
meaning of later information is changed in an attempt to make it fit more closely 
with the early information (Asch, 1946; Hamilton & Zanna, 1974; Zanna & Hamilton, 
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1977). The third, related explanation—the inconsistency discounting hypothesis—also 
maintains that early information establishes an expectation, but rather than changing 
the meaning of later information, this explanation instead supposes that people 
discount later information when it is inconsistent with their expectation (Anderson 
& Jacobson, 1965). Evidence for each of these three candidate explanations is mixed, 
and still debated today—but regardless, the phenomenon of a primacy effect6 in 
impression formation is robust (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Uleman & Kressel, 
2013). 
If we can rapidly form impressions about other people and groups, it seems 
plausible that we could also rapidly form impressions about ourselves—including 
how well we’re performing on a memory test, and the quality of our memory for an 
event. Perhaps, then, when people are asked to evaluate the quality of their memory 
after taking a memory test, those evaluations are a product of a global impression 
formed over the course of the test experience. More specifically, the first test 
questions could be most influential because they receive the most attention, or 
because they set an expectation of ease or difficulty through which the rest of the test 
is filtered, either by changing the meaning of later information, or by discounting it. 
But we have already shown that decreasing attention is an unlikely 
explanation for the influence of question arrangement. The change of meaning 
hypothesis is also an unlikely explanation. If people changed the meaning of later 
information to fit more closely to the meaning of early information, then we should 
expect that confidence ratings for easy questions would be higher when those 
questions appear first than when they appear last, and that confidence ratings for 
difficult questions would be lower when those questions appear first than when they 
appear last. But in the trivia questions paradigm, no consistent differences emerge in 
confidence ratings for individual questions according to their order (Weinstein & 
Roediger, 2010, 2012). Moreover, our own data provide at best only weak support 
for this prediction. For example, the average item confidence from Experiment 1 in 
                                                
6 Note that a primacy effect as described in the social cognitive literature on impression 
formation is not the same phenomenon as a primacy effect as described in the memory 
literature. Specifically, the primacy effect in memory refers to relatively better retrieval of 
information encountered early in a series than information encountered in the middle. The 
primacy effect in impression formation refers to evaluations of a target that are consistent 
with information encountered early in a series.  
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Part 1 was only slightly higher for subjects who began with easy questions, MDiff = 
0.23, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.48], t(100) = 1.91, p = .06. We cannot rule out the possibility of 
the third explanation, however: That people discount later information when it is 
inconsistent with their expectations. 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
The data from Part 1 cannot distinguish between two candidate mechanisms: 
anchoring-and-adjustment, and impression formation. In addition, the cognitive 
processes purportedly responsible for both these candidate mechanisms provide 
insufficient explanations. Specifically, in each case an additional process or “tweak” 
must be made to the explanation for it to work with our data. Nonetheless, the 
question remains: How does the order of questions shape eyewitnesses’ impressions 
of test performance and beliefs about the accuracy of their memory? 
We first took an exploratory approach in addressing that question. In 
Experiment 1, we asked subjects to make a prediction after every test question; 
estimating how many of the 30 total test questions they believed they would answer 
correctly. Where previously we had only one time point—that is, at the end of the 
test—this repeated questioning procedure instead lets us see how people’s beliefs 
about their performance develop over the course of the test. The results showed that 
difficult questions produced large changes in beliefs when encountered early, but 
the same questions produced virtually no change in beliefs when encountered late. 
In Experiment 2, we show that the beliefs people develop over the course of 
the test are not dependent on a particular test format. Similar to Experiment 2 from 
Part 1, the influence of question arrangement remained the same when we switched 
from a recognition test to a more difficult cued recall test format. 
The patterns of results from these two experiments were difficult to reconcile 
with an anchoring-and-adjustment explanation. We therefore next examined the 
extent to which impression formation was a viable explanation for the biasing 
influence of question arrangement. One of the assumptions underlying the process 
of impression formation is that people expect other individuals to have consistency 
in their behaviour (Asch, 1946; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). That assumption fits 
with a mechanism whereby people change the meaning of later information to more 
closely align with earlier information, or a mechanism whereby people discount 
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later information if it is inconsistent with earlier information. But when it comes to 
the behaviour of a group of individuals, we do not have this same expectation, 
because it is reasonable to expect that members of a group can be quite different 
from one another. We are therefore not as predisposed to discounting or changing 
the meaning of incoming information when it pertains to a group. To put it another 
way, we expect a degree of coherence in the behaviours or traits of an individual that 
we do not expect in a group (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; McConnell et al., 1994, 
1997). We attempted to capitalise on this difference in Experiments 3 and 4. 
In Experiment 3, we manipulated the test so that it appeared to be our 
standard individual test of 30 questions, or so that it appeared to be a group of 3 
tests consisting of 10 questions each. If the processes producing primacy effects in 
impression formation are reduced or eliminated when the target is a group rather 
than an individual, then the influence of question arrangement might be diminished 
when the test is made to appear as though it is a group of 3 tests. But the results 
showed that the influence of question arrangement was similar regardless of 
whether the test appeared to be a single test or a group of 3 tests. 
In Experiment 4, we tested a counter-explanation for the pattern of results 
from Experiment 3. Rather than manipulating the appearance of the test itself, we 
manipulated the ostensible source of the test questions. In one version, we told 
subjects that all the questions came from a single individual. In the other version, we 
told subjects that each question came from a different individual—all of whom were 
part of a group. We expected that this manipulation would make the test seem like a 
single test when all the questions came from a single individual, but would make the 
test seem more like a group of 30 tests when each question came from a different 
individual. But the results again showed that the influence of question arrangement 
was similar regardless of whether the test questions ostensibly came from 1 or 30 
people. 
With scarce evidence to support an impression formation explanation, we re-
focused our attention on an anchoring-and-adjustment explanation. In Experiment 5 
we examined the extent to which anchoring-and-adjustment is a viable explanation 
for the biasing influence of question arrangement. We gave some subjects an initial 
high or low anchor before the test, telling them that most people get 90% (or 10%) of 
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the questions correct. If anchoring-and-adjustment is a viable explanation for the 
influence of question arrangement, we should see people’s estimates of test 
performance and ratings of memory confidence skewed towards these anchors. 
Alternatively, if impression formation—and in particular the discounting of 
inconsistent information—is a viable explanation for the influence of question 
arrangement, we should see a diminished or reversed influence of question 
arrangement when the first questions are inconsistent with the anchor. The results 
suggest that people are sensitive to an initial anchor, and adjust away from it 
insufficiently.  
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Chapter 2 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to collect 100 observations per between subjects cell and 
ultimately recruited 219 Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure was the same as 
Experiment 1 from Part 1, except as follows. After answering each test question and 
giving a confidence rating for that question, subjects were asked the following: “This 
test consists of 30 questions total. How many of those questions do you think you 
will get correct?” Subjects responded with a number between 0 and 30. The only 
time this question did not appear was after the final test question. Here, we instead 
asked our two standard post-test questions: the retrospective estimate and the 
memory confidence rating. 
Results and Discussion 
How does the order of questions shape the beliefs people form of their own 
performance? To answer this question, we examined the mean predicted test scores 
people reported after each test question; these data appear in Figure 3. The figure 
shows that the influence of a question on a person’s beliefs about their test 
performance depends on the difficulty of that question, and when that question 
appears. High-to-low confidence subjects’ initial estimates were high (MTime1 = 23.83, 
SDTime1 = 4.79) and descended steadily over the course of the test (MTime30 = 18.49, 
SDTime30 = 5.38). But for low-to-high confidence subjects the pattern was markedly 
different. More specifically, the pattern was not just the inverse of the high-to-low 
confidence subjects. Instead, low-to-high confidence subjects’ initial estimates were 
already much lower than the high-to-low confidence subjects’ (MTime1 = 17.95, 
SDTime1 = 5.36) and continued to drop until reaching their lowest point after the ninth 
question (MTime9 = 10.00, SDTime9 = 6.87), at which point they ascended steadily over 
the remainder of the test (MTime30 = 15.08, SDTime30 = 5.04). 
To determine the extent to which these patterns would replicate and 
generalize to the more real-world situation of open-ended questions, we conducted 
Experiment 2. 
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Figure 3. Mean predicted test scores on a recognition test as a function of time and question 
arrangement. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects. We recruited 200 Mechanical Turk workers. Two subjects were 
excluded due to missing data. 
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure was the same as 
Experiment 2 from Part 1—using a cued recall test rather than a recognition test—
except that we also incorporated the continuous prediction questions from 
Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
We again examined the mean predicted test scores people reported after each 
test question; these data appear in Figure 4. This figure looks remarkably similar to 
Figure 3 from Experiment 1, bolstering the claim that the influence of a question 
depends on the difficulty of that question, and when that question appears. 
Moreover, these data show that this influence is consistent across different question 
formats. That consistency is important for three reasons. First, it suggests reliability. 
Second, it shows that question arrangement wields influence even when overall 
difficulty changes, because cued recall is a more difficult task than recognition. 
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Third, it suggests that the influence of question arrangement is plausible in field 
environments that typically rely on cued recall rather than recognition tests. 
 
Figure 4. Mean predicted test scores on a cued recall test as a function of time and question 
arrangement. 
 
As in Experiment 1, High-to-low confidence subjects’ initial estimates were 
high (MTime1 = 21.85, SDTime1 = 5.66) and descended steadily over the course of the 
test (MTime30 = 13.55, SDTime30 = 6.54). But for low-to-high confidence subjects the 
pattern was different, consistent with Experiment 1. Low-to-high confidence 
subjects’ initial estimates were already much lower than the high-to-low confidence 
subjects’ (MTime1 = 13.31, SDTime1 = 5.66) and continued to drop until reaching their 
lowest point after the eleventh question (MTime11 = 6.82, SDTime11 = 5.97), at which 
point they ascended steadily over the remainder of the test (MTime30 = 10.09, SDTime30 
= 4.37). 
Taken together, the patterns in Experiments 1 and 2 are difficult to reconcile 
with an explanation relying on the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. According 
to the heuristic, the ease or difficulty of early questions provides an anchor that 
constrains the adjustments people make to their evaluations over the remainder of 
the test. But that mechanism alone cannot account for the finding that an identical 
question produces a large change in people’s evaluations when it is encountered 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 5 10 15 20 25 29
M
ea
n 
pr
ed
ict
ed
 n
um
be
r c
or
re
ct
Time Point
High-to-low confidence
Low-to-high confidence
 46 
early yet almost no change when it is encountered late. More specifically, an 
explanation that relies purely on the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic would not 
predict the asymmetric patterns of changing estimates visible in Figures 3 and 4. 
The patterns are instead reminiscent of a process purportedly responsible for 
the effects seen in impression formation, whereby early information sets an 
expectation about future information, which tends to be discounted when it does not 
fit with the expectation. If that process is indeed responsible for the influence of 
question arrangement, then we would expect that people who first answer easy 
questions will discount the informational value of the later difficult questions, and 
that people who first answer difficult questions will discount the information value 
of the later easy questions. More concretely, people who first answer easy questions 
would develop an initial impression that they are performing well and, due to 
discounting, the later difficult questions cannot divorce them fully from that 
impression. Similarly, people who first answer difficult questions would develop an 
initial impression that they are performing poorly and, due to discounting, the later 
easy questions cannot divorce them fully from that impression. 
How might we test the extent to which impression formation processes are 
responsible for the biasing influence of question arrangement? One way would be to 
vary the coherence of the information people receive. We know from the literature 
that the processes responsible for primacy effects in impression formation are 
diminished when the same set of information is attributed to a group of people 
rather than a single individual (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; McConnell et al., 1994, 
1997). That difference is due to our underlying assumptions about the nature of 
individuals and groups. When it comes to an individual, we have learned to expect a 
strong degree of consistency—or coherence—to their behaviour (Schneider, 1973; 
Todd & Rapporport, 1964). For example, if I meet John for the first time and discover 
that he is friendly, then I expect John’s other attributes will fit with that trait; it 
would not make sense for John to also be callous. But when it comes to a group, this 
expectation of coherence is not as strong, because we have learned that groups can 
consist of individuals who vary in their behaviours and traits (Hamilton & Sherman, 
1996). For example, if I discover that John is a member of my gym, then I do not 
necessarily expect that when I meet Jane—who is also a member of my gym—that 
 47 
she will have traits similar to John’s; it is entirely reasonable for Jane to be callous, 
because the members of a gym probably have little in common other than wanting a 
place to exercise. 
This difference in our expectations about the coherence of individuals and 
groups leads us to process incoming information about these two types of targets 
differently. With an expectation of coherence in individuals, we form an initial 
impression and attempt to integrate later information into that impression. But 
because this expectation is either not present or not as strong for groups, we encode 
incoming information about the group but do not need to form an integrated 
impression. If we are then asked to report our impressions of individuals or groups, 
our response is a consequence of these processing differences: For individuals, our 
impression—formed “on-line” as we integrate incoming information—typically 
shows a primacy bias; For groups, our impression—formed from memory when we 
are asked to report—typically shows a recency bias (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; 
Hastie & Park, 1986; McConnell et al., 1994, 1997). 
If the influence of question arrangement is a consequence of an integrative 
impression formation process, then here we have a potential manipulation that 
could diminish or eliminate that process: Modifying the test so that it appears as 
though it is a group of tests, rather than a single individual test. If people form 
impressions about a group of tests similar to how they form impressions about a 
group of people, we should expect that the pattern of results will no longer resemble 
a primacy bias, and might instead resemble a recency bias. We ran Experiment 3 to 
test this idea. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to collect 400 data points, and ultimately recruited 419 
Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. We used a 2 (Question Order: high-to-low confidence, 
low-to-high confidence) x 2 (Test Coherence: individual, grouped) between subjects 
design. The procedure was the same as Experiment 1 from Part 1, except as follows. 
For half the subjects, we manipulated the test so that it now appeared to be three 
separate tests of 10 questions, rather than a single test of 30 questions. First, we 
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changed the wording of the instructions preceding the test from “You will now take 
a memory test”, to “You will now take three separate memory tests: Test 1, Test 2, 
and Test 3.” Second, we added a heading above each individual test question that 
read “TEST 1” (or 2, or 3, as appropriate). Third, we added a section break between 
Tests 1 and 2, and Tests 2 and 3, which read “Thank you. That’s the end of Test 
[1/2]. Please click Next to start Test [2/3].” We further distinguished the 3 tests by 
displaying each in a unique combination of font face, colour, and style. Specifically, 
Test 1 appeared in the font Arial, the colour red, and in bold (e.g., TEST 1); Test 2 
appeared in the font Times New Roman, the colour green, and in italics (e.g., TEST 
2); Test 3 appeared in the font Verdana, the colour blue, and in both bold and italics 
(e.g., TEST 3). 
As a manipulation check, we asked subjects the following question at the end 
of the experiment: “How many memory tests were there about Eric the Electrician?” 
Subjects responded with a number. We also requested—via an optional textbox—
that subjects tell us anything else they noticed about the memory tests. 
Results and Discussion 
We first carried out a manipulation check by examining subjects’ responses to 
the question about the number of memory tests. Initial casual inspection of these 
data revealed that just over half the subjects (n = 217, 52.04%) misunderstood the 
question. These subjects all responded with the number 30, probably because they 
incorrectly thought the question was asking, “How many individual questions were 
on the memory test?” A much smaller proportion of subjects gave a clearly incorrect 
answer (n = 27, 6.48%). The remainder (n = 173, 41.49%) gave the correct answer. 
Because the pattern of results was consistent when including or excluding subjects 
who misinterpreted the question or simply answered it incorrectly, we included all 
subjects in our analyses. We also found that question arrangement and test 
appearance only trivially influenced overall test performance, and the two factors 
did not interact. The accuracy differences across the cells in the design ranged from 
virtually nothing (0.0009) to a maximum of approximately half a question (0.48); All 
Fs < 1.77. 
We now turn to our primary question: How does manipulating the coherence 
of a test change the influence of question arrangement? To answer that question, we 
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once again examined subjects’ bias scores and reports of memory confidence, 
classified according to the order of questions and the appearance of the test. We 
display these data in Figure 5. As the left side of the top panel of the figure shows, 
we replicated the typical finding whereby question arrangement influences people’s 
beliefs about their test performance, Mdiff = 1.51, 95% CI [0.11, 2.92]. But recall that 
we expected that manipulating the test so that it appeared as though it was a group 
of 3 tests would diminish the influence of question arrangement. The right side of 
the top panel of the figure shows that, if anything, the opposite was true—the 
influence of question arrangement was larger when the test appeared as though it 
was a group of 3 tests rather than a single test, Mdiff = 3.08, 95% CI [1.61, 4.56]. We 
state this finding with caution, however, because the confidence intervals for these 
two results overlap considerably, meaning that zero is included in the range of 
reasonable estimates for the true size of the difference. In null-hypothesis terms, we 
found only a main effect of Question Order: MDiff = 2.30, 95% CI [1.28, 3.31]; t(417) = 
4.45, p < .001. 
The bottom panel of the figure displays people’s reported memory 
confidence, and provides additional, albeit limited support for the counterintuitive 
idea that question arrangement is more influential when a test appears as though it 
is a group of tests. The left part of the panel shows that—unlike the results from our 
previous experiments—question arrangement did not reliably influence people’s 
confidence in their memory, Mdiff = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.30]. The right part of the 
panel shows that question arrangement was slightly more influential when the test 
appeared as though it was a group of tests, Mdiff = -0.18, 95% CI [-0.44, 0.08]. We state 
this finding with caution too, because the confidence intervals all include zero as a 
plausible value. In addition, we found that people reported greater confidence in 
their memory when the test appeared as a single test than when the test appeared to 
be a group of 3 tests, Mdiff = 0.19, 95% CI [0.00, 0.37]. In null-hypothesis terms, we 
found only a main effect of Coherence; t(417) = 1.97, p = .050. 
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Figure 5. Top panel: Mean bias scores classified by Question Order (High-to-low confidence, 
Low-to-high confidence) and Test Coherence (Single, Grouped). Bottom panel: Mean reported 
memory confidence classified by Question Order (High-to-low confidence, Low-to-high 
confidence) and Test Coherence (Single, Grouped). 
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people’s beliefs about their test performance. But on the other hand, we did not 
replicate our earlier findings with respect to memory confidence. How can we 
explain that null result? One possibility is that the confidence judgement is less 
prone to the influence of question arrangement, because it is less tightly coupled to 
that manipulation than the retrospective test estimate (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 
2011). Confidence differences might therefore be less reliable, resulting in the 
occasional sample with a null result. Alternatively, the result could simply reflect 
sampling variability. Regardless of the true explanation, the more alarming result is 
the apparent backfiring of our coherence manipulation. Contrary to what we 
expected, question arrangement seemed to be slightly more influential when the test 
appeared as though it was a group of tests rather than an individual test. How can 
we explain those results? One possibility is that our manipulation was not strong 
enough, such that subjects did not perceive the grouped version of the test as three 
distinct entities that were different from one another. If so, then subjects may have 
continued to form an integrated impression and would therefore show the typical 
pattern of results that is consistent with a primacy bias. In Experiment 4, we used an 
alternative manipulation in an effort to address this counter-explanation. 
 
Experiment 4 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to collect 600 data points and ultimately recruited 609 
Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. We used a 2 (Question Order: high-to-low confidence, 
low-to-high confidence) x 3 (Sources: Unspecified, One, Thirty) between subjects 
design. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 from Part 1, except as 
follows. The two Unspecified source groups served as replication conditions of the 
standard question arrangement manipulation. For the remaining groups, we 
provided subjects with an additional piece of information in the instructions before 
the test. We told the One source groups, “All the questions on this test were written 
by one person.” We told the Thirty sources groups, “Each question on this test was 
written by a different person.” These statements appeared in bold in an effort to 
make them more noticeable. In addition, for these groups of subjects every question 
 52 
on the memory test was prefaced by the name of a person who was the ostensible 
source of the question. For example, subjects in the One source groups saw “Michael 
Thomas asks:” directly above each test question. Subjects in the Thirty sources 
groups also received this source information above each question, but every 
question was attributed to a different person. To construct the thirty names required 
for the Thirty sources groups, we searched Wolfram|Alpha for the 30 most popular 
first names (half male, half female) and 30 most popular surnames in the United 
States (Wolfram|Alpha, 2016). Surnames were then randomly assigned to first 
names, to create a final list of 30 names. For the complete list of these names, see 
Appendix E. Finally, after subjects in the One or Thirty sources groups had reported 
their estimated test scores and memory confidence, we asked them the following 
additional question: “How many people constructed the memory test about Eric the 
Electrician?” Subjects responded with a number. 
Results and Discussion 
We first carried out a manipulation check by examining subjects’ responses to 
the question about the number of people who constructed the memory tests. As in 
Experiment 3, initial casual inspection of these data revealed that approximately half 
the subjects either misinterpreted the question or simply answered it incorrectly (n = 
193, 47.42%). Closer inspection suggested that when people were uncertain, they 
merely guessed a number, because there were no clear patterns to the incorrect 
responses. Because the pattern of results was consistent when including or excluding 
these subjects, we included all subjects in our analyses. We also found that the order 
of questions and the number of sources had little effect on overall test performance, 
and the two factors did not interact. The accuracy differences across the cells in the 
design ranged from virtually nothing (0.01) to a maximum of less than one question 
(0.83); All Fs < 1.51. 
We now turn to our primary question: How does manipulating the coherence 
of a test—by making the questions appear to come from one single individual or 
from a group of 30 individuals—change the influence of question arrangement? To 
answer that question, we once again examined subjects’ bias scores and reports of 
memory confidence, classified according to the order of questions and the number of 
sources. We display these data in Figure 6. As the left side of the top panel of the 
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figure shows, we replicated the typical finding whereby question arrangement 
influences people’s beliefs about their test performance, Mdiff = 2.82, 95% CI [1.29, 
4.35]. We expected that when the test questions all ostensibly came from one person 
a similar pattern would emerge, but that when each test question ostensibly came 
from a different person the influence of question arrangement would be diminished. 
But as the rest of the top panel of the figure shows, the results are not entirely 
consistent with our predictions. On the one hand, the Thirty sources conditions 
showed a smaller influence of question arrangement, Mdiff = 1.87, 95% CI [0.45, 3.29]. 
But on the other hand, the One source conditions showed an even smaller influence, 
Mdiff = 1.22, 95% CI [-0.38, 2.82]. Moreover, confidence intervals across these 
differences overlapped considerably, suggesting that the influence of source was 
plausibly negligible. In null-hypothesis terms, we found only a main effect of 
Question Order, Mdiff = 1.97, 95% CI [1.10, 2.84]; t(607) = 4.45, p < .001. 
As the bottom panel of the figure shows, the findings with respect to reports 
of memory confidence were also somewhat inconsistent with our predictions. The 
left part of the panel shows that we found a small difference in confidence using our 
standard question arrangement paradigm, where question source is unspecified, 
Mdiff = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.44]. But the confidence interval suggests that the true 
size of this difference might plausibly be zero, and so this finding must be 
interpreted cautiously. Consistent with our predictions, the Thirty sources 
conditions showed a smaller influence of question arrangement, Mdiff = 0.04, 95% CI 
[-0.20, 0.28]. But as with bias, and inconsistent with our predictions, the One source 
conditions showed an even smaller influence—in fact, on average, no difference at 
all—Mdiff = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.27]. In null-hypothesis terms, we found no 
statistically significant effects; All Fs < 2.48. 
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Figure 6. Top panel: Mean bias scores classified by Question Order (High-to-low confidence, 
Low-to-high confidence) and Sources (Unspecified, One, Thirty). Bottom panel: Mean 
reported memory confidence classified by Question Order (High-to-low confidence, Low-to-
high confidence) and Sources (Unspecified, One, Thirty). 
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finding that appears to replicate fairly consistently. But question arrangement 
showed a weaker influence—and plausibly no influence at all—on people’s 
confidence in their memory. As discussed in Experiment 3, that weakened influence 
could be because people’s impressions about the test are less relevant to a judgement 
about the quality of their memory than they are to a judgement about test 
performance (Greifeneder et al., 2011). Specifically, the test experience is probably 
informative about test performance, but might not be informative about the quality 
of memory. For example, imagine a memory test where all the questions are about 
minute details that most people pay no attention to. The test experience will be 
informative about your test performance, but it says little about the quality of your 
memory, because you were never questioned about most of what you remember. In 
summary, the degree of relevance between the impression people develop over the 
course of the test and a judgement they make could moderate the impression’s 
influence on that judgement. 
In contrast to Experiment 3, but somewhat consistent with our predictions, 
we found that a less coherent test—in this instance, a test where each question came 
from a different person—resulted in a somewhat weaker influence of question 
arrangement on people’s beliefs about their test performance and confidence in their 
memory. Those findings could suggest that manipulating the number of sources was 
more successful in making the test seem like a group than manipulating the 
appearance of the test, and therefore diminished impression formation processes. 
But there are at least two reasons why we should not draw any strong conclusions 
from these findings. First, the confidence intervals around the differences across 
source conditions overlap considerably, and thus the manipulation plausibly does 
nothing at all. Second, both source conditions showed reduced influence of question 
arrangement relative to an unspecified source condition. If our hypothesis was 
correct—that impression formation processes are diminished or eliminated when the 
test appears more like a group than an individual—then we should only see a 
reduction in the influence of question arrangement in the Thirty sources conditions, 
and not in the One source conditions. Third, the One source conditions showed the 
greatest reduction in the influence of question arrangement—precisely the opposite 
of what we would expect to see. 
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Taken together, the findings from Experiments 3 and 4 provide at best only 
limited support for the explanation that the influence of question arrangement is due 
to an impression formation process, whereby incoming information is integrated 
into an initial expectation. We are left with two possibilities: [1] The influence of 
question arrangement is not the result of an impression formation process, and is 
instead the result of alternative mechanism(s), or [2] The influence of question 
arrangement is the result of an impression formation process, but our manipulation 
failed to adequately break down that process. 
In our final experiment, we used a different manipulation that we predicted 
would moderate the degree to which people integrate incoming information. 
Specifically, we manipulated people’s initial expectations about test performance. 
We told some subjects that they should expect to perform extremely well on the test, 
and we told others that they should expect to perform extremely poorly. If this 
information sets an initial expectation, then incoming information will be integrated 
more when it fits with that expectation, and less when it does not. For example, if I 
expect to get most questions right and the initial questions feel very easy, then I will 
integrate that information and rapidly form an impression that I am performing 
excellently—discounting later, difficult questions because they do not fit with my 
developing impression. If, however, I expect to get most questions right and the 
initial questions feel very difficult, I will do the opposite—discounting early, difficult 
questions and integrating later, easier questions. 
Manipulating people’s expectations about their upcoming performance can 
also be thought of as providing people with an explicit anchor. If people use the 
expectation of performance as an anchor, then we should see people’s estimates of 
test performance and reported memory confidence skewed towards these anchors. 
Specifically, people who are told to expect a high level of performance should show 
greater optimism in their test estimates and higher reported confidence in their 
memory than people who are told to expect a low level of performance. 
In summary, this manipulation leads to different predictions depending on 
the putative mechanism underlying the influence of question arrangement. If people 
rely on the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, then the influence of question 
arrangement should remain constant—the manipulation should simply skew all 
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people equally towards the given anchor. But if people rely on impression formation 
processes, then the influence of question arrangement should be reduced or even 
eliminated when people are given an initial anchor, because that anchor sets an 
expectation and changes which information gets integrated. 
 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Subjects. We aimed to recruit 600 subjects, and ultimately recruited 625 
Mechanical Turk workers. 
Design and Procedure. We used a 2 (Question Order: high-to-low confidence, 
low-to-high confidence) x 3 (Expectation: Unspecified, Low, High) between subjects 
design. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 from Part 1, except as 
follows. The two Unspecified expectation groups served as replication conditions of 
our standard question arrangement manipulation. For the remaining groups, we 
provided subjects with an additional piece of information in the instructions before 
the test. We told the Low expectation groups, “Please note: We find that people 
answer only about 10% of these questions correctly.” We told the High expectation 
groups, “Please note: We find that people answer just about 90% of these questions 
correctly.” These statements appeared in bold in an effort to make them more 
noticeable. Finally, after subjects in the Low or High expectation groups had 
reported their estimated test scores and memory confidence, we asked them the 
following additional question: “Can you recall what percentage of the questions 
about the video people normally answer correctly? If you’re unsure, please just take 
a guess.” We asked subjects in the Unspecified expectation groups the following 
alternative question: “What percentage of the questions about the video do you 
think people normally answer correctly?” Subjects responded with a number 
between 0 and 100. 
Results and Discussion 
We first carried out a manipulation check by examining subjects’ responses to 
the question about the percentage of test questions normally answered correctly. Of 
those subjects who were told this number in the instructions, 191 (30.66%) answered 
incorrectly, with answers widely distributed. Because the pattern of results was 
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consistent when including or excluding these subjects, we included all subjects in 
our analyses. We also found that the order of questions and the anchor had little 
effect on overall test performance, and the two factors did not interact. The accuracy 
differences across the cells in the design ranged from virtually nothing (0.01) to a 
maximum of less than one question (0.85); All Fs < 2.16. 
We now turn to our primary question: How does manipulating an initial 
expectation of test performance change the influence of question arrangement? To 
answer that question, we once again examined subjects’ bias scores and reports of 
memory confidence, classified according to the order of questions and the anchor. 
We display these data in Figure 7. As the left side of the top panel of the figure 
shows, we replicated the typical finding whereby question arrangement influences 
people’s beliefs about their test performance, Mdiff = 2.72, 95% CI [1.25, 4.20]. The 
middle portion of the top panel shows that question arrangement continued to 
influence people’s beliefs about their test performance even when they were 
expecting to perform poorly, Mdiff = 1.83, 95% CI [0.35, 3.30]. The right portion of the 
top panel shows that the same is true when people were expecting to perform well, 
Mdiff = 4.15, 95% CI [2.67, 5.63]. In null-hypothesis terms, we found a main effect of 
Question Order: Mdiff = 2.90, 95% CI [2.05, 3.75]; t(621) = 6.68, p < .001. 
In addition, we found that bias scores were skewed towards anchors. Subjects 
given the low expectation were most pessimistic, MLow = -5.54, 95% CI [-4.80, -6.29]. 
Subjects given no expectation were slightly less pessimistic, MUnspecified = -4.36, 95% 
CI [-3.60, -5.12]. Subjects given the high expectation were least pessimistic, MHigh = -
4.18, 95% CI [-3.39, -4.97]. In null-hypothesis terms, we found a main effect of 
Expectation: F(2, 621) = 3.80, p = .023. Follow-up Tukey tests showed that only the 
difference between Low and High expectation subjects was statistically significant, 
Mdiff = 1.35, 95% CI [0.10, 2.60], p = .030. 
As the left side of the bottom panel of the figure shows, we also replicated the 
typical finding whereby question arrangement influences people’s confidence in 
their memory, Mdiff = 0.34, 95% CI [0.10, 0.58]. This pattern was not apparent when 
people were expecting to perform poorly, as shown in the middle portion of the 
panel, Mdiff = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.21, 0.26]. The right portion of the panel, however, 
shows that question arrangement continued to influence people’s reports of memory 
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confidence when they were expecting to perform well, Mdiff = 0.33, 95% CI [0.07, 
0.59]. Given the considerable overlap of these confidence intervals, these findings 
must be interpreted cautiously. Collapsing across question arrangement, we found 
no strong evidence that reports of memory confidence were skewed towards 
anchors—all confidence intervals overlapped considerably. In null-hypothesis terms, 
we found only a main effect of Question Order: Mdiff = 0.23, 95% CI [0.09, 0.38]; 
t(623) = 3.23, p = .001. 
 
Figure 7. Top panel: Mean bias scores classified by Question Order (High-to-low confidence, 
Low-to-high confidence) and Expectation (Unspecified, Low, High). Bottom panel: Mean 
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reported memory confidence classified by Question Order (High-to-low confidence, Low-to-
high confidence) and Expectation (Unspecified, Low, High). 
 
Taken together, these results are more consistent with an anchoring-and-
adjustment explanation than an impression formation explanation. However, the 
findings are far from conclusive. Lending weight to the anchoring-and-adjustment 
explanation is the fact that—for bias scores—the influence of question arrangement 
was present regardless of the presence or absence of an anchor, and that the scores 
were skewed towards anchors. But on the other side of the scale, we note that these 
same patterns were not consistently present in people’s reports of memory 
confidence. Moreover, visual inspection of the top panel of Figure 7 suggests that the 
anchoring-and-adjustment explanation may be inadequate, because people who first 
answer easy questions seem more prone to the influence of an anchor than people 
who first answer difficult questions. Note, however, that we found at best only weak 
evidence for this interaction, Question Order x Expectation: F(2, 619) = 1.99, p = .137. 
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Chapter 3 
Across 5 experiments, we examined the mechanisms responsible for the 
influence of question arrangement on people’s beliefs about their memory. In 
Experiment 1, we showed that when the order of questions on a memory test is 
rearranged symmetrically, it produces asymmetrically developing beliefs about test 
performance. Subjects who began with easy questions initially believed they were 
performing well, and made only minor adjustments to this belief over the course of 
the test. But subjects who were given the same questions in the opposite order did 
not show a simple reversal of that pattern. Instead, subjects who began with difficult 
questions made dramatic changes to their initial beliefs about their test performance, 
before returning to a pattern of minor adjustments. We replicated these findings in 
Experiment 2, using a cued recall test. In Experiments 3 and 4, we examined the 
extent to which processes involved in forming impressions were responsible for the 
biasing influence of question order. We used two manipulations in an effort to make 
the test seem more like a group rather than an individual—manipulations that have 
been shown to prevent people from forming an impression that is unduly influenced 
by early information (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; McConnell et al., 1994, 1997). But 
the results from both experiments are difficult to reconcile with an impression 
formation explanation. In Experiment 5, we used a manipulation that leads to 
different predictions for two hypothesised explanations of the biasing influence of 
question arrangement: the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, and impression 
formation. We gave some subjects an expectation that they would perform extremely 
well on the test, and other subjects an expectation that they would perform 
extremely poorly. The results were more consistent with an anchoring-and-
adjustment explanation than impression formation. 
Taken together, this package of experiments lends some support to an 
anchoring-and-adjustment explanation for the influence of question arrangement on 
people’s beliefs about their memory. An initial anchor—provided by the 
experimenter, or generated from the subject’s initial experience—guides the 
adjustments people make over the remainder of the test. Because accurate 
adjustments take time and effort, people tend to rely on a mental shortcut, adjusting 
only until they reach a plausible value (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Fiske & Taylor, 
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2013). The resulting beliefs are therefore skewed towards the anchor. The findings 
from Experiment 5—where we manipulated anchors and found shifts towards those 
anchors—were somewhat consistent with this explanation. 
But there are at least two reasons why this explanation remains incomplete. 
First, the findings from Experiment 5 were not entirely conclusive. Although the 
high-to-low confidence subjects displayed a pattern of results that supported an 
anchoring-and-adjustment explanation, the pattern was less apparent for the low-to-
high confidence subjects. Second, an anchoring-and-adjustment explanation—in its 
typical formulation—would not predict the asymmetric patterns of developing 
beliefs in Experiments 1 and 2. Together, these findings suggest that an early 
experience of difficult questions is particularly influential. 
But why are difficult questions influential only when they appear early? One 
reason could be that people have an expectation from learned experience that tests 
typically begin with easy questions. Difficult questions would then be especially 
surprising when encountered early, receiving relatively more cognitive processing 
than when those same difficult questions are encountered late. That relative boost in 
processing could explain why the same questions produce different degrees of 
adjustment depending on when they are encountered. Although we have no direct 
evidence that people expect tests to begin with easy questions, education research 
shows that it is commonly recommended to arrange tests this way—both to boost 
student confidence early on, and to ensure students under time pressure do not miss 
the difficult questions—even though evidence is mixed with respect to whether 
question arrangement has any real influence on test scores (Aamodt & McShane, 
1992; Hambleton & Traub, 1974; Newman, Kundert, Lane Jr, & Bull, 1988; Sax & 
Cromack, 1966). 
Of course, a slightly modified anchoring-and-adjustment explanation is not 
the only plausible explanation. Recall from Chapter 1 that there are a number of 
counter-explanations that would predict the typical pattern of results that we find. 
The first counter-explanation is as follows: When making judgements about 
test performance and memory confidence, people might scan their memory of the 
test, and the information that comes to mind most easily would influence their 
judgements. Because people tend to rehearse early questions most, they could 
 63 
preferentially recall those questions. This primacy effect could explain the influence 
of question arrangement. But research using the trivia questions paradigm suggests 
that this counter-explanation is unlikely, because people actually remember the last 
few questions best, and moreover, biases develop as the test progresses—not merely 
at the end (Franco, 2015; Weinstein & Roediger, 2012). However, it is possible that 
the differences between the trivia questions paradigm and our own make a primacy 
explanation more viable in our case. One key difference, for example, is the number 
of questions that subjects are asked. In the trivia paradigm, subjects typically answer 
100 questions, but in our paradigm, subjects answer only 20 or 30 questions. Our 
smaller number means there is less opportunity—both in terms of time and amount 
of material—for later questions to compete with early questions in memory. This 
reduced retroactive interference makes a primacy effect more likely (Dey, 1969; Ecker, 
Brown, & Lewandowsky, 2015; McGeoch & McDonald, 1931). Because we never 
asked our subjects to recall test questions, we do not know whether a primacy effect 
is present. One simple future experiment could test this counter-explanation, by 
asking subjects to recall test questions as soon as they reach the end of the test. If the 
primacy effect is a valid explanation for the influence of question arrangement on 
eyewitness beliefs, then the questions subjects should most readily remember are the 
earliest ones. 
The second counter-explanation is as follows: The influence of question 
arrangement could be the result of a particular mental shortcut—the affect 
heuristic—where people rely on their feelings to inform their judgements. We find 
this explanation unlikely, because everyone answers the same overall pool of 
questions. The explanation is therefore incomplete—it would need to state why early 
questions are stronger manipulators of affect than later questions. Moreover, 
research in the trivia questions paradigm suggests that subjects find both 
arrangements of the test equally enjoyable (Weinstein & Roediger, 2010). But 
because we never asked subjects for affective ratings, we cannot rule out this 
counter-explanation. Again, a simple future experiment could test this counter-
explanation by asking subjects to rate how much they enjoyed the test, or how 
positive or negative they feel before and after the test. If the affect heuristic is a valid 
explanation for the influence of question arrangement on eyewitness beliefs, then 
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subjects who begin with easy questions should find the test more enjoyable, or feel 
more positively, than subjects who begin with difficult questions. 
The third counter-explanation is as follows: Early questions set an expectation 
about performance, and people attempt to integrate later information in with this 
expectation, building an impression that is influenced most by early, consistent 
information. In fact, the pattern of developing beliefs in Experiments 1 and 2 led us 
to suspect that this explanation was likely. Those patterns looked as though early 
questions rapidly set an initial impression about test performance, and later 
questions that did not fit with that impression were discounted—an explanation that 
can account for the asymmetric results of Experiments 1 and 2. But when we 
attempted to test this explanation further in Experiments 3 and 4, the results were 
inconsistent with what we would expect if the explanation were valid. Naturally, we 
must exercise caution with any inferences we draw from those studies, because an 
“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Oliver & Billingham, 1971, p5). 
More specifically, it is possible that the explanation is wrong, but it is also possible 
that the manipulation simply did not work. Anecdotally at least, it seems that the 
manipulation functioned as intended, because a number of people attributed the 
increasing or decreasing difficulty of questions to the separate tests, leaving 
comments like: “Test 3 was much harder than Test 1!” Finally, the results of 
Experiment 5 were more consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment explanation. 
Considered as a whole, the experiments here represent a novel contribution 
toward understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the influence of 
question arrangement on eyewitness beliefs. But at the same time, the puzzle is far 
from solved, and new questions have arisen. For instance, to be sufficient, 
modifications need to be made to the proposed explanations for these effects. What 
would those modifications tell us about the cognitive processes involved? Do they 
suggest multiple, additive processes, or processes that interact? Why does question 
arrangement influence some judgements consistently, like test performance—but 
other judgements less consistently, like memory confidence? Does that difference 
suggest anything about mechanism? 
 Overall, it appears that the most fruitful avenue for future exploration of 
mechanism lies with the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. After all, Experiment 5 
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suggests that people are sensitive to an initial anchor, and adjust away from it 
insufficiently. The reduced influence of the anchor for subjects who began with 
difficult questions suggests that these early, difficult questions compete with the 
anchor—possibly because they are surprising and highly influential. A future 
experiment could test that idea, by incorporating the design from Experiments 1 and 
2 where subjects repeatedly predict their test performance. If the early, difficult 
questions compete with the anchor, we should see that low-to-high confidence 
subjects’ predictions begin at the different anchor points, but come together rapidly 
in response to these highly influential questions. High-to-low confidence subjects, 
however, should maintain a degree of separation in their predictions across the 
course of the test. 
This package of experiments has implications for our understanding of the 
processes underlying eyewitness metacognition and metamemory. Broadly, the 
findings hint at potential boundaries to the influence of the anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic. In particular, it could be that salient information encountered 
early enough interacts with the heuristic, strengthening or weakening its use. 
Moreover, our paradigm—using a series of questions—extends the literature on 
anchoring-and-adjustment, suggesting that adjustments can be made continuously 
as more and more information is encountered. Alternatively, the findings could hint 
at potential boundaries to the influence of an impression formation process. In 
particular, that the coherence or entitativity of a target might be more than a product 
of its constituent parts; a group of tests seemed to be treated as though it was still a 
single cohesive test (Hamilton et al., 2015). Our paradigm extends the literature on 
impression formation too, suggesting the possibility that the processes responsible 
for the impressions we develop of others could extend to the impressions we 
develop of ourselves. 
Broadly, the findings extend what we know about factors that influence 
eyewitness memory. In tandem with the results from the experiments in Part 1, we 
can see that suggestive techniques are not a necessary component in the 
manufacturing of distorted eyewitness beliefs. Our seemingly trivial manipulation—
merely flipping the order of a set of questions—produces changes in eyewitness and 
juror beliefs that are similar in magnitude to more heavy-handed manipulations. 
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Considered together, the results are reminiscent of other literatures that investigate 
the influence of the seemingly trivial on human behaviour, including the ease of 
processing (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), feelings more generally, (Greifeneder et al., 
2011), the persuasiveness of neuro-jargon (Michael, Newman, Vuorre, Cumming, & 
Garry, 2013; Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008), and even our own 
expectations (Michael, Garry, & Kirsch, 2012). 
Our findings could see potential application in field contexts, like police 
interviewing procedures. On the one hand, we might expect that current best-
practice interviewing procedures, which encourage an early, rapport-building 
phase—particularly with children—are similar to starting a test with easy questions 
(Geiselman et al., 1984; Köhnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999; Memon, Cronin, 
Eaves, & Bull, 1993; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). That practice might 
inadvertently inflate interviewees’ beliefs about the quality of their memory. If so, it 
would be necessary to revise these best-practice techniques. Worse still, the results 
from Experiment 5 hint that this rapport-building practice might have its largest 
influence when people expect questions will be easy. But on the other hand, we 
know that building rapport helps interviewers extract more information from 
interviewees, and so it would be unwise to prematurely recommend any revision to 
current practice. Moreover, a rapport-building phase might be considered distinct 
from questions pertaining to a witnessed event, and might therefore have no 
influence at all. 
Of course, it would be unwise to make premature recommendations. This 
research represents a first step in examining the influence of question order in an 
eyewitness context, and accordingly features a number of limitations. First, the 
controlled linearity of question order as it appears in these experiments is unlikely in 
a forensic setting, where questions shift more dynamically as an interview 
progresses. To the extent that such linearity produces biased judgements, it is 
possible that our findings overstate the influence of question order in field settings. 
Second, real jurors see an eyewitness during examination. Our jurors, in contrast, 
read an eyewitness’s interview report. To the extent that the influence of order 
differs according to whether it takes place at interview or examination, we might 
expect to see an entirely different pattern of results in a field setting; perhaps by the 
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time the eyewitness takes the stand, it is a case of “too little too late.” Finally, we 
used an eyewitness event that is relatively innocuous. But many witnessed events 
are highly emotional, and might be associated with an initial level of confidence that 
is resistant to the influence of a subtle manipulation like question order. 
There are a number of important and interesting questions to address in 
future research. For example, just how far does the influence of question 
arrangement extend? We know from other eyewitness research that positive 
feedback about lineup decisions is dangerous. Not only does it boost people’s 
confidence in their lineup decisions, it also causes people to re-evaluate their 
memory, reporting that they got a better view, paid more attention, saw the suspect 
for longer, and more (Douglass & Steblay, 2006; Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Worse still, 
jurors are persuaded by these artificially superior eyewitnesses (Douglass et al., 
2010). On the one hand, then, we might expect that the influence of question 
arrangement will similarly cause eyewitnesses to re-evaluate their memory. But on 
the other hand, recall that—particularly in the experiments in Part 2—people’s 
reports of memory confidence were not consistently affected. That instability could 
suggest that the influence of question arrangement depends on how closely the 
judgement matches the manipulation itself. Nonetheless, it would be useful to test 
this idea empirically. 
Another important question relates to the misinformation effect—the extent to 
which people incorporate misleading information encountered after an event into 
their memories (Loftus, 2005). How would the influence of question arrangement 
affect people’s propensity to the misinformation effect? Imagine an experiment using 
the basic paradigm from Experiment 1 in Part 1, but with the following key change: 
Between watching the events in the video and taking the memory test, subjects read 
another eyewitness’s report about the events in the video. Included in that report are 
some misleading details. For example, if Eric drank a can of Coke, the report might 
claim that he drank a Pepsi. The question then, is how would the arrangement of 
questions on the memory test change people’s propensity to incorrectly choose those 
misleading details as their answers? One possibility is that an early experience of 
easy questions lulls people into a false sense of security, believing that the questions 
are simple and require little thought. If so, then we might expect that high-to-low 
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confidence subjects would engage in less effortful monitoring of the source of 
information that comes to mind when answering the questions, and would therefore 
be more prone to the influence of misleading information than their low-to-high 
confidence counterparts (Johnson et al., 1993). An alternative possibility is that an 
early experience of difficult questions could make people think their memory is 
terrible, second-guessing themselves. If so, then we might expect that low-to-high 
confidence subjects would defer their answers in favour of whatever they read in the 
report, and would therefore be more prone to the influence of misleading 
information than their high-to-low confidence counterparts (Dodd & Bradshaw, 
1980; Vornik, Sharman, & Garry, 2003). The implications in either hypothesised 
scenario are alarming, and so the question is worthy of attention. 
In conclusion, the collection of results in Part 2 fit with those in Part 1, 
painting a worrying picture of eyewitness and juror beliefs about memory. The way 
we think about what we remember is prone to the influence of a manipulation that—
at face value—is trivial. While we have yet to pin down the precise processes 
responsible for the influence of question arrangement, this work represents a first 
step in examining the underlying mechanisms. Perhaps most importantly, the 
package of experiments together provides strong evidence for the reliability of the 
influence of question arrangement, and paves the road for future exploration.  
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Appendix A 
Table 3. Demographic information about subjects in each experiment in Part 1. 
Experiment Condition Males (%) Females (%) Mean age (SD) 
1 High-to-low 21 (40) 31 (60) 32.31 (11.17) 
 
Low-to-high 21 (42) 29 (58) 32.76 (12.33) 
2 High-to-low 47 (43) 63 (57) 34.93 (12.67) 
 
Low-to-high 34 (31) 76 (69) 34.53 (12.23) 
3 High-to-low 42 (42) 57 (58) 33.13 (9.96) 
 
Low-to-high 41 (39) 65 (61) 34.40 (11.10) 
4 High-to-low 59 (46) 70 (54) 30.58 (10.73) 
 
Low-to-high 54 (41) 77 (59) 29.66 (9.82) 
5 High-to-low 63 (41) 90 (59) 34.01 (12.62) 
 
Low-to-high 67 (43) 89 (57) 33.58 (12.12) 
6 High-to-low 64 (41) 91 (59) 35.71 (12.56) 
 
Low-to-high 68 (43) 91 (57) 32.76 (11.10) 
 
Table 4. Demographic information about subjects in each experiment in Part 2. 
Experiment Condition Males (%) Females (%) Mean age (SD) 
1 High-to-low  52 (46) 60 (54) 34.49 (12.83) 
 
Low-to-high 44 (42) 62 (58) 33.52 (12.79) 
2 High-to-low 37 (36) 66 (64) 31.61 (10.67) 
 
Low-to-high 30 (32) 65 (68) 32.75 (10.82) 
3 High-to-low, 1 test 33 (32) 69 (68) 36.05 (11.88) 
 
Low-to-high, 1 test 32 (30) 75 (70) 36.94 (12.23) 
 
High-to-low, 3 tests 39 (38) 65 (63) 35.29 (10.66) 
 
Low-to-high, 3 tests 37 (35) 69 (65) 37.08 (13.09) 
4 High-to-low, 1 source 34 (34) 65 (66) 33.92 (11.53) 
 
Low-to-high, 1 source 40 (40) 59 (60) 33.92 (11.94) 
 
High-to-low, 30 sources 36 (33) 72 (67) 33.74 (10.87) 
 
Low-to-high, 30 sources 38 (37) 64 (63) 34.38 (12.64) 
5 High-to-low, No anchor 42 (40) 63 (60) 34.44 (10.82) 
 
Low-to-high, No anchor 41 (39) 64 (61) 34.85 (12.24) 
 
High-to-low, Low anchor 31 (30) 72 (70) 33.77 (12.13) 
 
Low-to-high, Low anchor 41 (39) 64 (61) 35.19 (11.98) 
 
High-to-low, High anchor 37 (36) 66 (64) 36.14 (12.45) 
 
Low-to-high, High anchor 33 (32) 71 (68) 35.39 (12.11) 
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Appendix B 
Table 5. Question information for the 30-item test. Questions are listed in the order they 
appeared in the High-to-low confidence version; this order is reversed for the Low-to-high 
confidence version. Answer options in bold represent correct answers. For the eight items 
with no bolded answer, the correct answer depended on the version of the video subjects 
watched. 
Question Option 1 Option 2 
Confidence 
Mean (SD) 
Eric ate ________ an apple a banana 4.79 (0.63) 
Eric played a _______ Video CD 4.73 (0.73) 
In the bathroom Eric stole ________ pills perfume 4.69 (0.82) 
Eric was wearing _______ Overalls jeans 4.62 (0.82) 
Eric stole ________ in the second 
bedroom 
Money a ring 4.55 (0.98) 
The jewelery that Eric stole in the first 
bedroom was ______ 
Earrings a necklace 4.03 (1.28) 
In the second bedroom, Eric tested a 
______ 
power point light fitting 4.00 (1.06) 
Eric found the house key under a 
________ 
door mat flower pot 3.93 (1.41) 
In the lounge the picture Eric looked at 
was the _______Tower 
Eiffel Leaning 3.91 (1.50) 
In the lounge Eric looked through a 
________ 
Journal photo 
album 
3.85 (1.37) 
The bed in the first bedroom was 
_________ 
made unmade 3.79 (1.29) 
The tool that Eric used in the kitchen was 
________ 
pliers screwdriver 3.75 (1.30) 
In the second bedroom, Eric tried on a 
_______ cap 
black blue 3.64 (1.39) 
Eric read the note from the homeowner 
in the ______ 
Kitchen hallway 3.64 (1.35) 
The magazine that Eric read was _______ Time Newsweek 3.56 (1.54) 
When Eric closed the living room doors, 
it was the ________ door that he closed. 
left right 3.51 (1.59) 
The curtains in the room where Eric 
worked on the light fitting were ________ 
open closed 3.46 (1.25) 
Eric drank a can of _______ coke pepsi 3.33 (1.52) 
Eric checked the time _______ on his 
watch 
on the wall 
clock 
3.18 (1.39) 
The name of Eric’s company was 
________ 
AJ's 
electricians 
RJ's 
electricians 
2.91 (1.58) 
The color of Eric’s van was ________ blue red 2.82 (1.41) 
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Question Option 1 Option 2 
Confidence 
Mean (SD) 
The color of the flowers where Eric 
retrieved the key were ________ 
yellow pink 2.82 (1.45) 
When Eric sat down to watch the 
television, the book on the coffee table 
was ________ 
open closed 2.59 (1.27) 
When Eric played the CD, the candelabra 
was to his ________ 
left right 2.30 (1.24) 
Eric rummaged through papers that were 
next to a _______ mug 
yellow white 2.20 (1.13) 
There were ________ remote controls on 
the coffee table. 
two three 2.08 (1.10) 
The color of the rubbish bin in the 
kitchen was ________ 
white grey 2.01 (1.11) 
The fireplace in the second bedroom Eric 
visited was 
covered uncovered 1.99 (1.05) 
The total number of pillows and cushions 
on the bed in the first room Eric visited 
was ________ 
four six 1.83 (1.05) 
There were ________ toothbrushes in the 
bathroom. 
two three 1.73 (1.06) 
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Appendix C 
Table 6. Question information for the cued-recall variant of the 30-item test. Questions are 
listed in the order they appeared in the High-to-low confidence version; this order is 
reversed for the Low-to-high confidence version. Answers were marked correct when they 
featured a keyword. 
Question Keyword(s) 
What did Eric eat? apple 
What type of media did Eric play? cd 
What did Eric steal from the bathroom? pill 
What style of trousers was Eric wearing? jeans 
What did Eric steal in the second bathroom? ring 
What type of jewelry did Eric steal in the first bedroom? ear, ring 
What did Eric test in the second bedroom? socket, outlet, plug 
What did Eric find the house key under? plant, pot, flower 
What was on the picture that Eric looked at in the lounge? eiffel, leaning 
What did Eric look over in the lounge? photo, album 
What state was the bed in the first bedroom in? unmade, made 
What tool did Eric use in the kitchen? screwdriver 
What color was the cap Eric tried on in the second bedroom? blue, black 
Where did Eric read the note from the homeowner? hall 
What magazine did Eric read? news, time 
Which side of the living room doors did Eric close? left 
In the room where Eric worked on the light fitting, what state 
were the curtains in? 
open 
What did Eric drink a can of? pepsi, coke 
What did Eric use to check the time? watch, clock 
What was the name of Eric’s company? aj, rj 
What color was Eric’s van? blue 
What color were the flowers where Eric retrieved the key? pink 
What state was the book on the coffee table in when Eric sat 
down to watch television? 
closed 
Which side of Eric was the candelabra on when he played the 
CD? 
right 
What color was the mug that was next to the papers Eric 
rummaged through? 
yellow, white 
How many remote controls were on the coffee table? three, 3 
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Question Keyword(s) 
What color was the rubbish bin in the kitchen? white 
In the second bedroom Eric visited, what state was the 
fireplace in? 
uncovered, covered 
What was the total number of pillows and cushions on the bed 
in the first room Eric visited? 
six, 6 
How many toothbrushes were in the bathroom? three, 3 
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Appendix D 
Table 7. Question information for the 20-item test. Questions are listed in the order they 
appeared in the High-to-low confidence version; this order is reversed for the Low-to-high 
confidence version. Answer options in bold represent correct answers. For the eight items 
with no bolded answer, the correct answer depended on the version of the video subjects 
watched. 
Question Option 1 Option 2 
Difficulty 
Mean (SD) 
What sort of bag did Chad bring to the 
party? 
Satchel Backpack 1.61 (1.07) 
What did Chad sort through at the small 
table in the lounge? 
Cutlery CD’s 1.79 (1.16) 
What did Chad add to the drink he made 
for the woman? 
A squeeze 
of lemon 
A vial of 
liquid 
1.79 (1.29) 
Where did Chad go when he was trying 
to find the toilet? 
Laundry Bedroom 1.84 (1.16) 
Where did Chad put the wallet he found 
on the kitchen counter? 
In his back 
pocket 
Back where 
he found it 
1.96 (1.37) 
When Chad knocked over the drink, 
what did he clean up the spill with? 
Paper 
towels 
Dish cloth 2.13 (1.31) 
What drink did Chad take out of his 
brown paper bag? 
Vodka Wine 2.23 (1.29) 
What decoration was hanging over the 
doorway to the lounge? 
Tinsel Happy 
Birthday 
Banner 
2.24 (1.44) 
What did Chad eat on his way back from 
the toilet? 
Chips Carrots 2.62 (1.22) 
What colour cup did the person who 
opened the front door have? 
Pink Blue 2.65 (1.51) 
Where was Chad when his cell phone 
rang? 
Leaving the 
kitchen 
Leaving the 
bathroom 
2.66 (1.15) 
How did Chad get into the house? Knocked on 
the door 
Rang on the 
doorbell 
3.04 (1.41) 
When Chad found it, was the toilet seat 
up or down? 
Up Down 3.08 (1.40) 
Were the curtains in the lounge closed or 
open? 
Closed Open 3.48 (1.37) 
What colour balloons were hanging over 
the bathroom door? 
Blue Red 3.58 (1.47) 
How many doors did Chad close at the 
party? 
Three Four 3.68 (1.16) 
What colour was the kitchen counter? Yellow Green 4.00 (1.09) 
What colour were the lounge walls 
painted? 
Peach Pink 4.02 (1.05) 
 86 
Question Option 1 Option 2 
Difficulty 
Mean (SD) 
What was the painting hanging over the 
drinks table of? 
Daffodils Sunflowers 4.21 (1.26) 
How many jacket hooks were there 
beside the drinks table? 
Four Five 4.67 (0.74) 
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Appendix E 
Table 8. List of names attributed as sources of the questions in Experiment 4. 
Emma Smith 
Noah Johnson 
Olivia Williams 
Liam Brown 
Sophie Jones 
Mason Miller 
Isabelle Davis 
Jacob Baker 
Ava Young 
William Wilson 
Mia Allen 
Ethan Anderson 
Emily Taylor 
Michael Thomas 
Abigail Wright 
Alexander Moore 
Madison Martin 
James Jackson 
Charlotte Thompson 
Daniel White 
Harper King 
Elijah Lee 
Sofia Scott 
Benjamin Harris 
Avery Clark 
Logan Lewis 
Elizabeth Robinson 
Aiden Walker 
Amelia Green 
Jayden Hall 
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Appendix F 
Table 9. List of questions assessing compliance with general instructions. Each question 
required a Yes or No response. 
Did you maximize the size of your web browser so that it covers your entire 
screen? 
Did you complete the experiment in a single session, without stopping? 
Did you pause or leave the experiment to engage in other tasks, even if they were 
other computer tasks? 
Did you use your web browser’s back or refresh buttons at any point during the 
experiment? 
Did you complete the experiment in an environment that is free of noise and 
distraction? 
Did you complete the experiment without anyone helping you? 
Did you speak with anyone at any time during the experiment? 
Please tell us whether you used a search engine at any point during the experiment 
to look anything up. 
 
